Game analysis of Chinese stakeholders in collective forest rights system reform

In the current stage of Chinese forest ownership reform, the central and local governments as well as the forest farmers play different roles with variations in their expected returns. Managing these respective relationships between the forestry stakeholders to maximize their benefits while actively engaging each stakeholder in the collective forest ownership reform process has become an important issue. This study uses the game theory methodology to analyze the relationship between the different reform stakeholders and then builds on the forest farmers’ participation in the reform model process at the reform movement micro-level. This model calculates the forest products equilibrium marketing sales and the government subsidies provided to the forest farmers, when the forest farmers willingly participate in the reform process. It will provide a reliable basis for formulation of government policies which positively impacts Chinese forestry reform.     

中国环境管理干部学院动物伦理教育概述

对中国环境管理干部学院的动物伦理教育进行了总结,提出动物伦理教育是大学生思想政治教育的一个重要方面的观点,指出动物伦理教育不仅事关动物,而且关系到大学生人格的培养。     

Economic and Ecological Rules for Water Quality Trading1

Horan, Richard D. and James S. Shortle, 2011. Economic and Ecological Rules for Water Quality Trading. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):59‐69. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00463.x Abstract: Emissions trading in textbook form uses markets to achieve pollution targets cost‐efficiently. This result is accomplished in markets that regulators can implement without knowing pollution abatement costs. The theoretical promise of emissions trading, along with real‐world success stories from air emissions trading, has led to initiatives to use trading for water pollution control. Yet, trading, particularly when it involves nonpoint sources of pollution, requires significant departures from the textbook concept. This paper explores how features of water quality problems affect the design of markets for water pollution control relative to textbook emissions markets. Three fundamental design tasks that regulators must address for pollution trading to achieve an environmental goal at low cost are examined: (1) defining the point and nonpoint commodities to be traded, (2) defining rules governing commodity exchange, and (3) setting caps on the commodity supplies so as to achieve an environmental target. We show that the way in which these tasks are optimally addressed for water quality markets differs significantly from the textbook model and its real‐world analogs. We also show that the fundamental appeal of emissions trading is lost in the case of realistic water quality markets, as market designs that reduce the costs of achieving water quality goals may no longer be implementable without the regulatory authority having information on abatement costs.     

Optimal Pollution Trading Without Pollution Reductions: A Note1

García, Jorge H., Matthew T. Heberling, and Hale W. Thurston, 2011. Optimal Pollution Trading Without Pollution Reductions: A Note. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):52‐58. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00476.x Abstract: Various kinds of water pollution occur in pulses (e.g., agricultural and urban runoff). Ecosystems, such as wetlands, can serve to regulate these pulses and smooth pollution distributions over time. This smoothing reduces total environmental damages when “instantaneous” damages are marginally increasing. This paper introduces a water quality trading model between a farm (a pulse‐pollution source) and a firm (a more steady pollution source) where the object of exchange is the “temporary” retention of runoff as opposed to total runoff reductions. The optimal trading ratio requires firm emissions to be offset by more than a proportional retention of the initial agricultural runoff pulse. The reason is twofold: (1) emissions are steady or constant over time and, in this sense, have relatively larger environmental impact; and (2) certain kinds of runoff management cause delayed environmental damages.     

Emissions trading of global and local pollutants, pollution havens and free riding

In the presence of local (sulfur) and global (carbon) pollutants, we examine the pollution haven hypothesis and free riding behavior. Under domestic emissions trading, poorer Southern countries become pollution havens when free trade opens up whenever sulfur damage functions are linear or when sulfur levels in equilibrium are not higher in the South. With global trading of carbon permits, the pollution haven effect emerges in equilibrium whenever the convex sulfur damage functions are nonlinear. Countries that do not participate in a Global Protocol designed to reduce carbon emissions enjoy double benefits, stemming from free riding and cleaner local environments.     

制度与市场机制在治理污染中的作用

寻找一种既能促进经济发展又能保护环境的控制环境污染的有效途径具有十分重要的意义。新制度经济理论为环境污染的控制及其政策的制定提供了理论基础。该理论认为,当传统的管制方法不能实现资源最优配置的时候,通过界定产权和进行产权交易的方法是可以得到满意结果的。     

The regional economic impact of reducing greenhouse gas emissions: Western Australia

This study analyses the general-equilibrium impacts of an international climate change response policy on the economy of Western Australia (WA), one of the most mining-based and energy-intensive states of Australia. It finds that emissions would fall by up to 11% from the base level in WA. However, such environmental benefits emanate at some costs to the state economy; in terms of foregone gross state product, the costs are up to 3% of the base level. Indeed, the actual costs and benefits depend on the precise design of the climate change response policy as well as on the other policies within which it operates. For example, when emission quota permits are sold to industries and no tradeable carbon credits (i.e. credits for the carbon sequestrated in Kyoto forests) are granted, emissions decline by about 8% and GSP falls by about 3% of the base levels. If carbon credits are tradeable, however, the environmental benefits could be increased and the GSP cost could be reduced substantially. Also, the reduced economic activity caused by emission abatement results in a modest fall in net government revenue, despite the additional revenue from permit sales in some cases. Accordingly, government’s fiscal package surrounding the emission permits would influence the emission abatement impacts on the economy. With regard to the effects on the structure of the state economy, the oil and gas industry suffers only a slight contraction but the energy-supplying sector as a whole contracts substantially. It is therefore not surprising that the impacts on the WA economy of curbing emissions by energy and transport industries alone are quite significant when compared to those resulted from all industries’ compliance with the abatement scheme. It needs to be noted that the model projections analysed in the paper are based on simplifying assumptions and tentative scenarios, and hence should be viewed with caution and not be understood as unconditional forecasts.     

排污权交易是控制环境问题的一种有效途径

排污权交易是解决环境外部不经济性的手段,与传统的控制环境问题手段相比,它具有在确保环境质量目标的前提下,以控制环境污染成本最小化实现资源最优配置的优点,符合我国国情,是我国控制环境问题的有效途径。     

总量控制区域排污权的初始分配方法

提出了区域排污权的初始分配方法该方法通过引入"平权函数"和"平权排污量"保证初始排污权分配的现实性和公平性;通过引入"有效环境容量"保证初始排污权分配与环境质量目标相一致作为简化实例,本方法应用于某区域SO₂排污权的初始分配,该区域包括3个子控制区、12种行业类型．分配结果合理可行。     

“排污权”和“碳排放权”交易的减污降碳协同效应研究——基于污染治理和政策管理的双重视角

全面系统地评估排污权交易和碳排放权交易的减污降碳协同效应,对于进一步发挥应对气候变化和大气污染治理的协同效应、推进全国统一生态环境市场建设具有重要意义。本文基于污染治理和政策管理的双重视角,采用多时点双重差分和倾向得分匹配,分别检验排污权交易和碳排放权交易的减污和降碳效应;并在此基础上,研究三种政策情景下（排污权交易、碳排放权交易以及组合政策）的协同减排效应差异。研究表明,从污染治理视角,排污权交易和碳排放权交易均显著降低了二氧化硫和二氧化碳排放量,实现了减污降碳的协同效应;从政策协同管理视角,在减少二氧化硫污染方面,组合政策比各类政策的单独实施更为有效;在降低二氧化碳排放方面,碳排放权交易比排污权交易和组合政策更为有效。因此,在推进气候变化应对和大气污染治理机制融合的进程中,应有所侧重地推进碳排放权交易和排污权交易组合使用。