环境管制过程中的管制者与被管制者行为分析

环境污染的经济负外部性对污染者具有激励作用,因此,解决环境问题的关键是对污染者加以管制.作为管制者的政府,需要了解排污者的污染严重程度,并据此限制和惩罚排污者的负外部性,作为被管制对象的排污者,有的要隐瞒真相,逃避惩罚.本文在环境污染的经济外部性和一般消除对策分析的基础上,通过分析环境管制过程中管制者和被管制者之间的博弈对策和行为,说明了惩罚的轻重程度导致的结果决然不同.博弈的最优策略表明,只有一定数额的排污罚金才可以起到惩治的作用,高额罚金不仅可以激励排污者真实披露污染信息,为污染治理提供科学依据,还可以降低政府的检测概率,减少政府在管制过程中的交易成本,因此,以高额度的罚金管制污染者应成为政府重要的管制手段.     

基于外部性的中小企业集群可持续竞争力内在机制研究

理论界对企业集群竞争力的解释与研究焦点．主要集中于对集群的积极效应的论证，基于负外部性的中小企业集群可持续性竞争力是一个尚未引起重视的研究领域。本文借鉴有关集群竞争力理论，提出了外部性是中小企业集群可持续竞争力内在源泉的观点。从外部性角度对中小企业集群可持续竞争力的内在机理进行挖掘。对中小企业集群外部性的主要形式及其效应进行了分析。本文还根据基于外部性的中小企业集群可持续竞争力产生机理模型，由集群的负外部性（成本）、正外部性（收益）曲线变化出发，研讨外部性、集群生命周期与集群竞争力变动的关系。提出了旨在提升中小企业集群可持续竞争力的“负外部性”规避对策。     

A two-agent dynamic model with an invasive weed diffusion externality: an application to Yellow Starthistle (Centaurea solstitialis L.) in New Mexico

This paper presents a bioeconomic model for two agents, a cattle rancher and a non-rancher, with interdependencies between their individual effort of invasive weed management and profitability. Dynamic simulations allow us to find numerically the optimal effort of weed control over a 5-year time horizon under a variety of beginning infestation levels. In a base-case scenario without governmental cost-share of control costs, we find that efforts to control the weed are not profitable. The base-case scenarios also indicate that grazing contributes to giving the invasive weed a competitive edge. A second series of simulations include incentive payments for weed control which are set at the minimum level required to have a net positive impact on the rancher's profitability. From these simulations, we find that the level of infestation impacts the size of the incentive necessary to get the agent to control the weeds and that the incentive payments impact the level of effort of the rancher. In addition, results reveal that the higher incentive payments for lower levels of weed infestations reduce the total cumulative incentive payments over time. Efficient policies directed towards management of invasive weeds may need to be adjusted for each individual case.     

Evaluating internalization of multifunctionality by farm diversification: evidence from educational dairy farms in Japan

Farm diversification by farmers' open-door policy generates opportunities for farmers to internalize externalities of multifunctionality. Although the educational function of agriculture is an example of such an open-door policy and is attracting growing attention, this function has been little explored. To promote farm diversification in this direction, this paper examined how and to what degree farmers internalize externalities of multifunctionality by focusing on the educational function provided by dairy farming, i.e., farming experience services, in Japan. The main findings were as follows. First, we can say that the educational function is determined by ordinary technical jointness as well as institutional jointness, which is represented by food culture and the agrarian heritage. Both the technical and institutional jointness enhanced the externality. Because of these two working factors, there is a U-shaped relationship between farm diversification and provision of farming experience services. Second, however, an empirical evaluation indicated that farmers only partially internalize educational externalities by treating them as supplementary services combined with processed milk products. Therefore, appropriate integrated management of these newly emerging educational services to become a viable market should be fully addressed in the future, especially for family farms.     

脚手架工人低估不安全行为风险的研究

为验证脚手架工人是否低估不使用安全带和高处抛扔物体2项不安全行为的风险,工人的年龄和工作年限是否会影响他们对2项不安全行为的风险评估,以及工人是否会低估不安全行为的外部性,通过问卷调查的方式让脚手架工人和管理人员对2项不安全行为的风险进行评估,然后借助方差分析(ANOVA)和t检验2种统计学方法对风险评估值进行分析。结果显示:工人显著低估2项不安全行为的风险,并且工人倾向于低估不安全行为给他人造成伤害的严重性,但是工作年限和年龄对风险评估的影响不显著。最后,结合上述研究结果提出避免工人低估2项不安全行为风险的管理建议。     

Environmental Capital,Negative Externality and Carbon Finance Innovation

In the context of global climate change,the internalization of negative externality,which is brought about by the traditional mode of economic growth,has become an inevitable choice.In order to achieve the internalization,it is necessary to make innovations on the market mechanism and system,find the value of environmental capital,establish a new mode of economic growth based on environmental capital,and then transform the environmental capital,an exogenous factor of economic growth,into an endogenous factor.Of this,the key of market mechanism and system innovation is the financial innovation that is based on environmental capital and negative externality;the government defines the initial property right of environmental resources and establishes environment energy trading market,so as to guide enterprises to trade environmental resources(represented by carbon emission permit trading) based on the Clean Development Mechanism,and to vigorously develop environmental finance and carbon finance.     

Environmental policy with collective waste disposal

Centralized collection and disposal is an integral component of waste management strategies for many solid and liquid wastes, and carbon capture and storage is currently being considered for gaseous waste. In this paper we show how collective waste disposal systems introduce essential changes in the design of optimal environmental policy. Absent collective disposal, an optimal environmental policy imposes relatively stringent regulations on polluters in regions where local environmental damage functions are “high”; however, under collective waste disposal, the optimal environmental policy level increases monotonically over distance from the disposal site, and this is true irrespective of the degree of spatial heterogeneity in local environmental damage functions. We characterize the optimal spatial pattern of environmental policy levels under collective waste disposal and identify optimal membership size for waste disposal networks comprised of homogeneous producers.     

The price of innovation: An analysis of the marginal cost of green buildings

Energy efficiency plays an important role in reducing the carbon externality from buildings, but economic analyses of more efficient, green building have thus far ignored input costs. This paper finds that the average marginal cost of green-labeled construction projects is smaller than the value premiums documented in the literature. However, design fees, representing just a fraction of development costs but paid largely up-front, are significantly higher for green construction projects. These projects also take longer to complete. The results provide some insight into the market barriers and market failures that may explain the relatively slow adoption of otherwise economically rational green construction practices.     

流域生态补偿理论探讨

流域生态补偿是协调流域生态环境保护和经济发展之间矛盾,调整流域内区域间损益关系的有效手段。文章从流域内人类活动产生的损益人手,论述了流域生态补偿的概念、理论基础和运行机铷,并利用经济学原理,对生态补偿的必要性和补偿标准进行了理论解析,给出了流域生态补偿必要性的理论依据和需要补偿量的理论值。在此基础上,根据流域人类活动的正负外部性等原则,对流域生态补偿进行了分类。依据流域生态补偿分类,梳理出了我国流域生态补偿重点区域。通过对流域生态补偿理论探讨,以期作为进一步研究和应用实践的参考和启示。     

基于外部性视角的区域生态补偿理论问题研究

当面对实现区域协调发展这一重大科学和实践命题时，生态补偿自然要同时解决人地关系中的区域关系，这就是区域生态补偿问题。地理运动构造了地理环境的整体性，而现实中的区域都具有产权区域属性，产权区域分割地理环境的整体性，使跨区域的地理运动演化为一个区域对其他区域的影响，即区域外部性问题。区域外部性所要解决的核心问题是判断外部性的“作用区域”，从而讨论外部性的空间特性，包括作用方向、范围和空间格局，并最终得到关于区域分布和区域关系的更加深入的认识。区域外部性理论能从特定的角度回答诸如为什么要实施区域生态补偿，如何确定补偿中的责任主体，如何设计补偿方式和确定补偿标准等区域生态补偿中的一些基本理论问题，从而成为其重要的理论基础。