An Assessment of Stakeholder Perceptions and Management of Noxious Alien Plants in Spain

Despite biological invasions being a worldwide phenomenon causing significant ecological, economic, and human welfare impacts, there is limited understanding regarding how environmental managers perceive the problem and subsequently manage alien species. Spanish environmental managers were surveyed using questionnaires to (1) analyze the extent to which they perceive plant invasions as a problem; (2) identify the status, occurrence, and impacts of noxious alien plant species; (3) assess current effort and expenditure targeting alien plant management; and, finally, (4) identify the criteria they use to set priorities for management. In comparison to other environmental concerns, plant invasions are perceived as only moderately problematic and mechanical control is the most valued and frequently used strategy to cope with plant invasions in Spain. Based on 70 questionnaires received, 193 species are considered noxious, 109 of which have been the subject of management activities. More than 90% of species are found in at least one protected area. According to respondents, the most frequently managed species are the most widespread across administrative regions and the ones perceived as causing the highest impacts. The perception of impact seems to be independent of their invasion status, since only half of the species identified as noxious are believed to be invasive in Spain, while 43% of species thought to only be casual aliens are causing a high impact. Records of management costs are poor and the few data indicate that the total actual expenditure amounted to 50,492,437 € in the last decade. The majority of respondents stated that management measures are insufficient to control alien plants due to limited economic resources, lack of public awareness and support, and an absence of coordination among different public administrations. Managers also expressed their concern about the fact that much scientific research is concerned with the ecology of alien plants rather than with specific cost-efficient strategies to manage alien species.     

Global climate change in the instrumental period

The instrumental period of climate history began in the 18th century with the commencement of routine weather observations at fixed sites. Estimates of global-mean climate (e.g. temperature and precipitation) were not possible, however, until the establishment of extensive observing networks midway through the 19th century. This paper reviews our knowledge of global climate change in the instrumental period. Time series of global-mean temperature and precipitation are examined and a comparison is made between two independent 30-year climatologies: 1931-1960 and 1961-1990. Examples are also provided of regional-scale climate changes. Such assessments are important for two reasons. First, they establish the variability of climate on the time-scale of decades, time-scales upon which it is reasonable to plan economic and socio-political activities. Second, and more specifically, they enable us to quantify the magnitude of global-mean climate change which has occurred over this period. Such detailed diagnostic climate information is a necessary, although not sufficient, prerequisite for the detection of global-scale warming which may have occurred due to the enhanced greenhouse effect. Some attention is given to explanations of the observed changes in global-mean climate.     

Resolving whether botanic gardens are on the road to conservation or a pathway for plant invasions

A global conservation goal is to understand the pathways through which invasive species are introduced into new regions. Botanic gardens are a pathway for the introduction of invasive non‐native plants, but a quantitative assessment of the risks they pose has not been performed. I analyzed data on the living collections of over 3000 botanic gardens worldwide to quantify the temporal trend in the representation of non‐native species; the relative composition of threatened, ornamental, or invasive non‐native plant species; and the frequency with which botanic gardens implement procedures to address invasive species. While almost all of the world's worst invasive non‐native plants occurred in one or more living collections (99%), less than one‐quarter of red‐listed threatened species were cultivated (23%). Even when cultivated, individual threatened species occurred in few living collections (7.3), while non‐native species were on average grown in 6 times as many botanic gardens (44.3). As a result, a botanic garden could, on average, cultivate four times as many invasive non‐native species (20) as red‐listed threatened species (5). Although the risk posed by a single living collection is small, the probability of invasion increases with the number of botanic gardens within a region. Thus, while both the size of living collections and the proportion of non‐native species cultivated have declined during the 20th century, this reduction in risk is offset by the 10‐fold increase in the number of botanic gardens established worldwide. Unfortunately, botanic gardens rarely implement regional codes of conduct to prevent plant invasions, few have an invasive species policy, and there is limited monitoring of garden escapes. This lack of preparedness is of particular concern given the rapid increase in living collections worldwide since 1950, particularly in South America and Asia, and highlights past patterns of introduction will be a poor guide to determining future invasion risks.     

Beyond Counting Climate Consensus

Several studies have been using quantified consensus within climate science as an argument to foster climate policy. Recent efforts to communicate such scientific consensus attained a high public profile but it is doubtful if they can be regarded successful. We argue that repeated efforts to shore up the scientific consensus on minimalist claims such as “humans cause global warming” are distractions from more urgent matters of knowledge, values, policy framing and public engagement. Such efforts to force policy progress through communicating scientific consensus misunderstand the relationship between scientific knowledge, publics and policymakers. More important is to focus on genuinely controversial issues within climate policy debates where expertise might play a facilitating role. Mobilizing expertise in policy debates calls for judgment, context and attention to diversity, rather than deferring to formal quantifications of narrowly scientific claims.     

Representing uncertainty in climate change scenarios: a Monte-Carlo approach

Climate change impact assessment is subject to a range of uncertainties due to both incomplete and unknowable knowledge. This paper presents an approach to quantifying some of these uncertainties within a probabilistic framework. A hierarchical impact model is developed that addresses uncertainty about future greenhouse gas emissions, the climate sensitivity, and limitations and unpredictability in general circulation models. The hierarchical model is used in Bayesian Monte-Carlo simulations to define posterior probability distributions for changes in seasonal-mean temperature and precipitation over the United Kingdom that are conditional on prior distributions for the model parameters. The application of this approach to an impact model is demonstrated using a hydrological example. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Adapting to Climate Change in Africa

The intersection of present vulnerability and the prospect of climate change in Africa warrants proactive action now to reduce the risk of large-scale, adverse impacts. The process of planning adaptive strategies requires a systematic evaluation of priorities and constraints, and the involvement of stakeholders. An overview of climate change in Africa and case studies of impacts for agriculture and water underlie discussion of a typology of adaptive responses that may be most effective for different stakeholders. The most effective strategies are likely to be to reduce present vulnerability and to enhance a broad spectrum of capacity in responding to environmental, resource and economic perturbations. In some cases, such as design of water systems, an added risk factor should be considered.     

Climatic Implications of Revised IPCC Emissions Scenarios, the Kyoto Protocol and Quantification of Uncertainties

In December 1997, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) adopted the Kyoto Protocol. This paper describes a framework that models the climatic implications of this international agreement, using Monte Carlo simulations and the preliminary Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change emissions scenarios (SRES). Emissions scenarios (including intervention scenarios), climate sensitivity, and terrestrial carbon sink are the key sampled model parameters. This framework gives prior probability distributions to these parameters and, using a simple climate model, posterior distributions of global temperature change are determined for the future. Our exercise showed that the Kyoto Protocol's effectiveness will be mostly dependent upon which SRES world evolves. In some worlds the Protocol decreases the warming considerably but in others it is almost irrelevant. We exemplified this approach with a current FCCC issue, namely “hot air”. This modelling framework provides a probabilistic assessment of climate policies, which can be useful for decision-makers involved in global climate change management. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Social capital and the political economy of violence: a case study of Sri Lanka

This article examines the links between militarised violence and social capital (trans)formation. It first maps out emerging theoretical and policy debates on social capital and violent conflict and questions a number of the assumptions underpinning these debates. This is followed by an empirical analysis of several war-affected communities in Sri Lanka. The case studies illustrate that the links between militarised violence and social capital are complex, dynamic and context specific. It is argued that social capital cannot be understood in isolation from political and economic processes, and the belief that violent conflict inevitably erodes social capital is questioned. Finally, the implications for external agencies are highlighted. Rather than focusing on engineering social capital, external agencies need to focus on understanding better the preconditions for social capital formation and how they can contribute to the creation of an enabling environment. This requires as a starting-point a rigorous analysis of political and economic processes.