Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons

We investigate whether positive framing increases cooperation in three social dilemmas with slightly different properties: a linear public goods (PG) game, a non-linear PG game, and a common pool resource (CPR) game. Results from our laboratory experiments show that contributions to a linear PG are higher if the externality is framed positively, rather than negatively, corroborating earlier findings by Andreoni (1995). By contrast, we find no such framing effects in the non-linear PG game or the CPR game. In these games, the best response in the material payoffs is to contribute less if others contribute more, counteracting effects of pro-social preferences. Positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons.     

Strategic investment in reputation

Although collective efforts are common in both animal and human societies, many human and probably animal social dilemmas have no obvious cooperative solution, which is a challenge for evolutionary biologists. In public goods games, i.e. the experimental paradigm for studying the sustainability of a public resource with human subjects, initial cooperation usually declines quickly. Recently, it has been shown that the interaction with another social game in which good reputation attracts help, can maintain a high level of cooperation in the public goods game. Here we show experimentally that humans use different strategies in the public goods game conditional on whether the player knows that his decisions will be either known or unknown in another social game. The knowledge of being recognized as the same individual in both scenarios motivates players to invest in their reputation and thus sustain the public resource. However, cooperation declines immediately when individual identities switch from being recognizable to being unrecognizable between the two interacting games.Communicated by M. Borgerhoff-Mulder     

Reputation is valuable within and outside one’s own social group

To find conditions under which humans cooperate within groups of unrelated individuals has been of major interest in the behavioral sciences. The experimental paradigm for studying potential cooperation in social dilemmas is the public goods game. Here humans regularly fail to sustain a public resource cooperatively. However, the need to maintain good reputation for other social interactions, such as indirect reciprocity, has been identified as an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation in public goods situations. As a side effect of building a good reputation through cooperative actions, an individual provides direct benefits to members of his/her own social group. These benefits could be an incentive to reward a good reputation of group members. Here we show experimentally that building a good reputation through cooperative behavior in a public goods situation is rewarded in future social interactions, not only within ones own social group but also, at a similar level, in other social groups: humans regard cooperative behavior of others as an honest signal irrespective of past direct personal benefits. Reputation gained within as well as outside ones own social group can be a driving force for selfish individuals to cooperate in public goods situations, and thereby sustain any public resource.Communicated by T. Czeschlik     

2010年亚运会对广州市可持续发展的影响

2010年举办的第16届亚运会将是广州有史以来承办的最大型的综合性体育赛事。分析了亚运会的举办将对广州市经济、社会发展、城市与环境建设等方面的影响,并提出了全面贯彻可持续发展思想,进一步办好亚运会的建议:立足长远,社会效益与经济效益并重;加大生态环境建设力度;加大宣传力度,推动公众参与;加强区域合作,协调区域发展。     

当代公共生活面临的伦理困境研究

在当前中国社会转型时期,人们的生活方式、行为方式、价值规范和文化观念都发生了急剧的变化,使得公共生活产生了许多新的伦理问题,面临着新的伦理困境.主要表现在:一是"熟人社会"向"陌生人社会"转变,交往实践前所未有的拓宽了,信息交流产生不对称;二是社会公共生活在"情"和"理"之间矛盾增加;三是群己调适的问题凸显,在"群己"问题上更强调二者的合理性共存.参9.     

Game theoretic analysis of environmental impact assessment system in China

Environmental impact assessment (EIA) system has been established in China since 1973. In present EIA cases, there are four participants in general: governments, enterprises, EIA organizations and the public. The public has held responsible for both social costs and social duties. The public supervises social costs produced by enterprises discharging pollutant in EIA. However public participation is mostly deputized by governments, which severely weaken the independence of the public as one participant in EIA. In this paper, EIA refers to the different attitudes of the participants whose optional strategies may be described by a proper game model. According to disfigurements in EIA, three sides (governments, enterprises, and EIA organizations) dynamic iterative game theory, dynamic game theory of incomplete information, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium theory to analyze the reciprocity relation among governments, EIA organizations and enterprises. The results show that in a short period, economic benefit is preponderant over social benefit. Governments and enterprises both do not want to take EIA to reveal social costs. EIA organizations’ income comes from enterprises and the collusions are built between them to vindicate economic benefit. In a long run, social benefit loss caused by environmental pollution must be recuperated sooner or later and environmental deterioration will influence the achievements of economic benefit, so both governments and enterprises are certain to pursue high social benefit and willing to take EIA, helpful to increase private benefit. EIA organizations will make fair assessment when their economic benefit are ensured. At present, the public as silent victims can not take actual part in EIA. The EIA system must be improved to break the present equilibrium of three sides, bringing the public to the equilibrium to exert public supervision.     

Negotiating a voluntary agreement when firms self-regulate

Does self-regulation improve social welfare? We develop a policy game featuring a regulator and a firm that can unilaterally commit to better environmental or social behavior in order to preempt future public policy efforts. We show that the answer depends on the set of policy instruments available to the regulator. Self-regulation improves welfare if the regulator can only use mandatory regulation, but it reduces welfare when the regulator opts for a voluntary agreement. This suggests that self-regulation and voluntary agreements are not good complements from a welfare point of view. We derive policy implications, and extend the basic model in several dimensions.     

International environmental agreements with support

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. We assume their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, in order to induce larger coalitions, higher levels of public good provision and higher payoffs. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (e.g. abatement of greenhouse gas emissions), there exist equilibria with support. Allowing for support increases payoffs to each of three types of agents: members, supporters and free-riders.     

Bidding games for valuation of aesthetic environmental improvements

An empirical case study of the benefits of abatement of aesthetic environmental damage associated with the Four Corners power plant and Navajo mine using the bidding game technique is presented. Bidding games were carefully designed to avoid the potential problems inherent in that technique. The results indicate the existence of substantial benefits from abatement of this aesthetic environmental damage. Aggregate bid curves, marginal bid curves, and estimates of the income elasticity of bid are presented. The effectiveness of the bidding game technique is discussed.     

Trade''s Dynamic Solutions to Transboundary Pollution

This study develops a differential game to examine the effects of trade liberalization on transboundary water pollution. Water pollution is due to wastewater emissions from countries in a shared waterway along the U.S.–Mexico border with available data of pollution abatement costs, public health damages, and trade benefits. Noncooperative and cooperative games are examined with changes in trade policy and public health damages. Results show trade liberalization leads Mexico to curtail pollution in both games. Cooperation and trade liberalization limit emissions from both countries and curtail strategic behavior of the United States from Mexico's pollution control efforts in the noncooperative game.     

宁波市公众环境意识调查与分析

公众环境意识是一个国家和民族文明程度的重要标志,它从各个方面反映出所调查地区的环境现状、公众对环境问题的认知、环保素质和环保行为,能够为政府的宏观决策提供依据。文章在数据分析的基础上,阐述了宁波市公众在地区环境问题、公民环境责任、环保支付意愿、绿色消费和固体废物收集处理等方面的调查结果,并给出了结论和建议。     

A cultural model of private provision and the environment

This paper analyses an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities and capital accumulation where private contributions to environmental quality are motivated by a desire to socialize others into environmental attitudes. In this framework, the formation of environmental preferences is the result of a cultural transmission process depending on the extent of private contributions. In the short run, we show that three equilibria may arise: a first one where all green agents contribute to the environment, a second one where nobody contributes to the environment and a third interior one. We show that the capital-accumulation process and the change in preferences that occur in this economy lead the interior equilibrium to be selected, in which some, but not all, green agents contribute to the environment. The model thus provides an economic rationale for the gap between the number of people who care about the environment and the number who adopt pro-environmental behaviours. We also show that the fraction of contributors rises with capital, so that we explain the negative relationship between this gap and country income. Last, we show that this gap is particularly detrimental for welfare, and analyse the impact of a number of public policies.     

Those outsiders: How downstream externalities affect public good provision

Some policy problems pit one group?s interests against another?s. One group may determine provision of a project (such as a dam) that benefits group members but hurts others. We introduce a model of such projects. In-group members may contribute to a common fund that benefits them as a public good. Benefits from the project may vary within the group. Provision has negative downstream externalities: contributions hurt agents outside the in-group (“Outsiders”), rendering them anti-social. Many models of social preferences predict that such externalities should reduce provision, although conditional cooperation or a preference for in-group members may counteract this. We test this model with a lab experiment using Outsiders with whom the in-group members have more and less contact. With homogeneous in-group benefits, the presence of negative downstream externalities reduces contributions by half when they have closer contact with Outsiders but not at all when they have had no contact. We introduce a rotating high-return position that allows subjects to trade favors. In this setting, contributions of non-privileged members diminish slightly when faced with the negative externality given closer contact with Outsiders, and not at all with less contact. Reciprocal giving occurs whether or not Outsiders are present.     

Designs with a priori information for nonmarket valuation with choice experiments: A Monte Carlo study

Good practice in experimental design is essential for choice experiments used in nonmarket valuation. We review the practice of experimental design for choice experiments in environmental economics and we compare it with advances in experimental design. We then evaluate the statistical efficiency of four different designs by means of Monte Carlo experiments. Correct and incorrect specifications are investigated with gradually more precise information on the true parameter values. The data generating process (DGP) is based on estimates from data of a real study. Results indicate that D-efficient designs are promising, especially when based on Bayesian algorithms with informative prior. However, if good quality a priori information is lacking, and if there is strong uncertainty about the real DGP—conditions which are quite common in environmental valuation—then practitioners might be better off with shifted designs built from conventional fractional factorial designs for linear models.     

Negotiating environmental agreements under ratification constraints

We analyze the impact of ratification constraints on the optimal terms of international environmental agreements (IEAs). For this, we combine the literature on IEAs with the public choice literature on two-level games. By also incorporating uncertain preferences of the pivotal voter in the ratification stage, we make several important contributions: (i) we contribute to a more realistic modeling of the temporal structure of international agreements, (ii) we show a surprising, yet intuitive non-monotonic relationship between the optimal commitment level and the variance of ratification decisions, (iii) we identify reasons to expect a larger number of countries to join international negotiations than predicted by most of the coalition formation literature based on a representative agent model. Ratification constraints thereby can improve the welfare gains from stable international agreements.     

Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms Bargain

We compare outcomes with an emissions tax and an emissions standard when a firm and regulator engage in cooperative bargaining over the stringency of the regulation. Bargaining is motivated by giving the firm a choice of abatement technologies. If the firm's preferred technology differs from the regulator's, the first-best outcome is not an equilibrium of the traditional noncooperative game in which the regulator is a Stackelberg leader. The regulator may therefore choose to offer the firm a more lenient regulation if it agrees to switch technologies. We find that the resulting bargaining outcomes differ for a tax and a standard even though information is symmetric, and we identify conditions under which each instrument yields lower social costs.     

上市公司会计数字游戏的剖析

本文从会计数字游戏产生的根源着手，分析了上市公司会计数字游戏滋生的内、外部条件及诱因，进而分析如何才能够减少会计数字游戏．     

Discounting for personal and social payments: Patience for others,impatience for ourselves

The market rate of return on private investment is often used as the discount rate when conducting cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of public projects. I argue that the decision to invest pits current consumption against future consumption, both of which accumulate to the private decision maker. Public projects, on the other hand, provide benefits that accrue to society in general. To examine the appropriateness of discount rates based on returns to private investment, this paper considers lab experiments designed to test whether individuals discount personal and social benefits at different rates. Personal benefits are captured through personal monetary payments, while social benefits are captured through anonymous donations to charitable organizations. I jointly elicit time and risk preferences and find that subjects discount charitable contributions at significantly lower rates than personal payments.     

博弈论在环境保护中的应用

阐述了博弈论的基本理论在环境保护中的应用,分析结果指出应结合市场机制和政府政策改变博弈方的收益,使博弈达到有利于环境保护的纳什均衡,提高环境保护效率;并探讨了博弈论在环境保护中应用的关键技术与策略。     

公共管理与公众参与策略：于桥水库水质改善项目

环境问题是在人类的发展与资源的开发过程中产生的 ,是多种因素综合作用的结果 ,解决任何一个环境问题都将涉及到若干部门和公众 ,决不是一个部门所能完全胜任的。因此 ,采用公共管理与公众参与的模式解决环境问题 ,是改善环境质量的必然途径 ,是一个政府环境管理能力的综合体现。文章阐述了公共管理与公众参与的内涵、目标、目的、基本原则和实施程序等。