知识型员工的特点、激励及管理对策研究

知识经济时代，企业最宝贵的财富是知识型员工。知识型员工是生产力的代表。知识型员工的工作效率决定了企业的竞争能力．因此。如何激励知识型员工成为企业探讨的一个重要问题．本文从知识型员工的特点入手。按有关知识管理专家提出的激励因素，从四个方面阐述了对知识型员工的激励策略。并提出了对知识型员工的管理对策．     

会计信息失真引发的思考

会计信息失真是当前严重影响社会经济正常秩序的一个突出问题．会计信息失真的表现形式是多样化的，因而导致会计信息失真的原因也是多种多样的，而且比较复杂，其原因并非正式约束机制的软化及正式约束机制的滞后和缺乏，为治理会计信息失真，必须从制度方面和技术方面两方面共同努力．     

目前医患关系现状及对策研究

医患关系是社会关系的组成部分，医患关系是医疗实践活动中最基本的人际关系，良好的医患沟通是实现以病人为中心，促进社会和谐的基础．医患关系作为一种最基本的社会关系，已普遍受到人们的关注，它随着医学模式的发展，不断发生新的变化．目前我国经济正沿着市场化的轨迹发展，医疗制度改革也在深入进行，这对构建和谐医患关系提出了新的挑战和考验，要想构建和谐的医患关系，必须医方、患方、社会三者共同努力，国家增加卫生投资力度，准确定位医疗机构的性质，确保广大中低档人群的基本健康等实际问题已摆在我们面前，只有从根本上解决群众“看病难、看病贵”的问题，才能实现医患关系真正意义上的融洽．同时我们还要看到，理想化的期待与非理想化的现实差距是客观存在，融洽医患关系是一个漫长的过程，需要我们在健全法制的同时提高自律的约束，只有以诚信为杠杆、人文为基石，才能真正实现理想状态下的医患关系，即充满同情心的医生和对医生充满信任的病人．参8．     

遗传算法在度约束最小生成树问题中的应用

遗传算法是一类借鉴自然界生物种群“自然选择、优胜劣汰”进化过程的启发式随机搜索优化算法,具通用性好、鲁棒性强等特点,被广泛地应用于通信网络设计领域,如度约束最小生成树问题．通过讨论遗传算法在度约束最小生成树问题中的应用,并对遗传算法在应用时存在的问题和挑战提出了见解．参17．     

以科学为基础的化学品管理战略

针对欧洲化学品管理系统REACH的数据要求，本文提出许多改进建议．要实施根据物质的有害作用进行分类的当前标准，这些数据要求显得不足．在数据收集中以产量作为优先制定的标准，这是成问题的．提出了优先制定机制的三项替代建议：物质的化学性质；低层次检测的结果；对自动检测的激励．一个新的分类办法（未充分研究）亦被提出．在这个办法里，物质将根据警示标识予以鉴别．     

劳资关系的分配视角分析

从历史发展进程的角度分析了劳资关系及其变化问题,并重点探讨劳动与资本之间分配关系的动态变化．“资本雇佣劳动”这种制度安排有其历史发展过程中的“路径依赖”特征,各种不同经济与法律环境对其形成与存在提供基础,而今后经济发展的复杂化将对传统的劳资关系产生重要的影响．劳资之间分配关系是劳资关系中最为重要而根本性的体现,劳资关系的变迁对于其分配关系也将产生影响,使劳资之间的分配模式从传统的“以物质资本为中心”的分配模式向新型的“以人力资本为中心”的分配模式转化．     

物种灭绝的若干种可能的序

利用集合种群共存动力模式，研究了由于栖息地毁坏而导致物种灭绝的顺序问题．研究结果表明：在群落里各物种种群具有相等的死亡率的假设下，栖息地毁坏而导致物种的灭绝存在3种最基本可能的顺序，既最弱物种与最强物种相伴灭绝，最强物种与最弱物种是强弱交替灭绝，以及由强而弱依次灭绝．参7     

荷兰环境协议:分担可持续工业发展的责任

工业界与政府共同努力，可以利用合作性协议来达到雄心勃勃的环境质量目标．这样的协议，只要能激励所涉及工业的革新性能力，就会比命令与控制思路更加卓有成效．政府在其颁发许可证时无法要求各公司开展有深远意义的革新，而且规定变革也不属于法规的性质，除非这些变革肯定能实现．各公司对它们自己的技术可能性要比法规当局清楚得多．然而，对于要取得成功的合作性协议来说，工业界需要改变它的传统态度和采用有益于所有各方的环境政策     

建设与建筑物拆除废物再循环的经济效益与环境效益

建筑业内部与清洁技术和综合资源管理有关的重要问题包括废旧建筑物拆除和建筑材料再循环．根据材料与建筑工程试验和研究实验室国际联合会最近的工作（技术委员会Ｎｏ．１２１，《废旧建筑物拆除和水泥与石料重复利用指南》）介绍了欧盟及其它国家中目前的发展．讨论了不同层次的技术研究、经济机会和政治战略，特别注意到有关应用和现实目标．描述了最典型的障碍．关于如何克服这些障碍的讨论侧重于灾后重建．     

农户绿色生产技术采纳行为决策:政策激励还是价值认同?

以湖北省1 086个农户调研数据为研究对象,利用Logit回归模型、中介效应检验模型和调节效应检验模型,围绕政策激励、价值认同对农户有机肥施用行为的影响机制问题进行了深入探讨。结果表明:(1)农户有机肥施用行为受到政策宣传、政府补贴、法规约束、环境危机意识和生态环境改善等多个因素影响;(2)环境危机意识、生态环境改善和农耕文明传承在政策宣传与农户有机肥施用行为之间起中介作用,生态环境改善在法规约束与农户有机肥施用行为之间起中介作用;(3)政府补贴增强了环境危机意识与农户有机肥施用行为之间的正向关系。基于此,创新发展以农业绿色生产为导向的绿色补贴,积极开展当前我国农业发展所面临的形势教育,转变只注重技术如何使用的传统技术推广方式,以便调动农户有机肥施用积极性,实现农业绿色发展。     

Cross-Hauling of Polluting Factors

This paper analyzes the investment/environment overlap using a two stage model of two jurisdictions. Capital exports are modeled as choice variables for capital owners who weigh income considerations against the effects of capital exports on the quality of their local environments and on environmental policy. This framework reveals that capital owners have an incentive to cross-haul polluting factors across jurisdictions when direct controls are used to regulate emissions and that this cross-hauling induces policymakers to ratchet up environmental policies in both locations. The importance of instrument type and commitment on environmental policy is also analyzed.     

Optimal investment to reduce the decay rate of an income stream: The case of soil conservation

Some natural resource investments are unique from a capital theory point of view because they do not create a new income stream, but rather alter the rate of change of an existing stream of income or social benefit. The marginal conditions for such investments are explored and possible incentive methods are examined for the case of soil conservation expenditures.     

The production of exclusive spaces in coastal pre-urban areas: Causes and motivations: Middle shoreline of Caspian Sea in north of Iran

The most common form of building in coastal peri-urban area, in middle shoreline of Caspian Sea in North of Iran, is gated community with the exclusive ownership and restricted access to the public shoreline. This research aims to clear the main causes, motivations and mechanism of exclusive space production in North of Iran. In contrast to the fact that many studies revealed as gated communities rose from the service-base motivations of the residents such as safety and high quality of the environment, this research shows the market-base motivations for living inside the gates. The factors of maintaining and increasing the property capital and protecting the family prestige are the main motivations for residence in gated communities in North of Iran. Due to the privileged life style and importance of agricultural lands for building gated communities, the main incentive of land owners for selling the agricultural lands is to derive benefit from selling lands and saving financial capital in Banks, instead of agricultural activities. The negligence of regulations in guidance and control of agricultural lands and in the processes of land use changes, causes the effectiveness of informal relations and illegal production of exclusive space in the context of environmental lands.     

Devising Appropriate Policies and Instruments in Support of Private Conservation Areas: Lessons Learned from the Klein Karoo,South Africa

Abstract: The amount of privately conserved land is increasing worldwide. The potential of these areas to contribute to the global conservation of biodiversity is significant, given that statutory protected areas alone will not suffice. Nevertheless, there is still inadequate support for private conservation areas, and further research on appropriate, flexible, and generally applicable incentive measures is necessary. We conducted 25 semistructured interviews with the owners of private conservation areas in the Little Karoo, South Africa, to examine landowner opinions of existing conservation policies and their relationships with the local conservation authority. We also assessed landowner preferences regarding conservation incentive measures. Landowners doubted the conservation authority's capacity to implement its stewardship program and were also discouraged by the bureaucracy of the program. The conservation authority was often viewed negatively, except where landowners had experienced personal contact from conservation staff or where strong social capital had formed among landowners. Landowners did not desire financial rewards for their conservation efforts, but sought recognition of their stewardship role and greater involvement from the conservation authority through personal contact. We conclude that conservation policies for private lands could benefit from the provision of extension services to landowners, promotion of formation of groups of landowners and other stakeholders, and public acknowledgment of the contributions private conservation areas make.     

Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

Competitive investment in clean technology and uninformed green consumers

In a market where consumers and the regulatory authorities are not fully informed about the actual production technology or environmental performance of firms that engage in strategic competition, I study the effect of environmental consciousness of consumers on firms׳ incentive to invest in cleaner technology. Firms compete in prices and may signal their environmental performance to uninformed consumers through prices. I also analyze the effect of an expected liability on firms in this setting. Compared to full information, incomplete information generates higher strategic incentive to invest in cleaner technology particularly when consciousness and/or expected liability are not too high. Requiring mandatory disclosure of technology or environmental performance may discourage such investment. Even though consumers and the regulator are uninformed, competition has a positive effect (relative to monopoly) on the incentive to invest.     

Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition

In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition.     

Oil Exploration under Climate Treaties

In this paper we focus on how an international climate treaty will influence the exploration of oil in non-OPEC countries. We present a numerical intertemporal global equilibrium model for the fossil fuel markets. The international oil market is modelled with a cartel (OPEC) and a competitive fringe on the supply side, following a Nash–Cournot approach. An initial resource base for oil is given in the non-OPEC region. However, the resource base changes over time due to depletion, exploration, and discovery. When studying the effects of different climate treaties on oil exploration, two contrasting incentives apply. If an international carbon tax is introduced, the producer price of oil will drop compared to the reference case. This gives an incentive to reduce oil production and exploration. However, the oil price may increase less rapidly over time, which gives an incentive to expedite production and exploration. In fact, in the case of a rising carbon tax we find the last incentive to be the strongest, which means that an international climate treaty may increase oil exploration in non-OPEC countries for the coming decades and reduce OPEC's market share.     

Incentives for Biological Conservation: Costa Rica's Private Wildlife Refuge Program

Abstract: The alarming pace of tropical biodiversity loss requires development of innovative approaches for in situ biodiversity conservation. Incentive-based approaches have emerged as one possible option. We interviewed 68 private nature reserve owners to learn more about one of Costa Rica's incentive programs. The interview group included all reserve owners participating in the government's Private Wildlife Refuge Program (n = 22) and a control group of nonparticipating owners (n = 46). Quantitative and qualitative data led to seven main conclusions on the use of incentive programs: (1) a developing country can expand and enhance its formal park system through conservation incentives; (2) insufficient promotion, and resulting information gaps, can prevent an incentive program from realizing its full potential; (3) landowners enter a program not only in response to the intended incentive package, but also for several powerful and hidden incentives such as publicity and marketing purposes; (4) underutilization of official incentives by participants, in part due to sporadic delivery of incentives by the government, can undermine program effectiveness; (5) biodiversity protection goals can be accomplished by means of a wide range of incentives; (6) programs that require only a short-term commitment by landowners can still lead to long-term biodiversity protection; and (  7) a program can produce unanticipated negative consequences at the national level, including putting conservation at odds with social justice. These and other lessons on the use of incentives should be of interest wherever biodiversity is threatened, wherever new conservation partners are being sought, and wherever incentive-based approaches are being considered.