The good life of creatures with dignity some comments on the swiss expert opinion

The notion of Dignity of Creatures has been voted into the Swiss Federal Constitution by a plebiscite. Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber have given an expert opinion for the Swiss government to clarify the notion of Dignity of Creatures. According to them, by voting this notion into the Swiss constitution, the Swiss have chosen for a limited biocentric approach towards biotechnology. In such an approach genetic engineering of non-human beings is only allowed insofar that their own good is not impaired. It is, however, not clear when the good of a non-human being is impaired. I defend the position that — even if we confine ourselves to animals — their good goes beyond their well being.     

Human Dignity and the Dignity of Creatures

In their report for the Swiss government onthe notion of the dignity of creatures, PhilippBalzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber analyzethe relationship between human dignity and the dignityof creatures, taking them as two categoricallydifferent concepts. Human dignity is defined as the``moral right not to be humiliated,' whereas thedignity of creatures is taken to be ``the inherentvalue of nonhuman living beings.' To my mind there isno need to draw a categorical distinction between thetwo concepts. Both notions could be brought togetherunder an all-encompassing concept of the inherentvalue of living beings, humans and non-humans alike,a concept one could name ``the dignity of livingbeings.' Indeed, this very notion underlies theposition taken in the report, although this is notmade explicit by the authors themselves.As the aim of the paper is only to clarify theconcepts used, I do not go beyond this ``internal'critique of their position, i.e., I don't assess howthe claims articulated via these concepts – theclaim that humans and/or creatures have an inherentvalue consisting in a supposed intrinsic good – areto be justified, although I myself would be ratherskeptical that this might be successfully done.     

Human dignity and the dignity of creatures

In their report for the Swiss government on the notion of the dignity of creatures, Philipp Balzer, Klaus-Peter Rippe, and Peter Schaber analyze the relationship between human dignity and the dignity of creatures, taking them as two categorically different concepts. Human dignity is defined as the “moral right not to be humiliated,” whereas the dignity of creatures is taken to be “the inherent value of non-human living beings.” To my mind there is no need to draw a categorical distinction between the two concepts. Both notions could be brought together under an all-encompassing concept of the inherent value of living beings, humans and non-humans alike, a concept one could name “the dignity of living beings.” Indeed, this very notion underlies the position taken in the report, although this is not made explicit by the authors themselves. As the aim of the paper is only to clarify the concepts used, I do not go beyond this “internal” critique of their position, i.e., I don’t assess how the claims articulated via these concepts — the claim that humans and/or creatures have an inherent value consisting in a supposed intrinsic good — are to be justified, although I myself would be rather skeptical that this might be successfully done.     

GIS-based assessment of the threat to world forests by patterns of non-sustainable civilisation nature interaction

The paper presents a novel transdisciplinary approach to investigate non-sustainable civilisation–nature interactions in the context of global change. The approach rests on the decomposition of intricate dynamics of Global Change into problematic patterns civilisation nature interactions (‘syndromes’) this is done by an iterative process of observations, data and theoretical system analysis and GIS-based modelling attempts. These syndromes of global change characterise endangering and risky developments of civilisation nature interaction and represent a baseline for measuring and indicating ‘non-sustainability’; in order to have a sustainable development it is necessary to have a far-reaching absence of syndromes. They encompass the core problems of global change, e.g. soil degradation, climate change, threats to biodiversity or global deforestation. Patterns are defined as characteristic constellations of global change trends (‘symptoms’). Cause–effect schemes of symptoms and their interrelations are constituted as complex phenomena resulting from interactions over the different spheres of the Earth system (biosphere, atmosphere, hydrosphere, population, pedosphere, economy, psychosocial sphere, social organisation, science and technology). The approach is illustrated by an analysis of civilisation–nature interaction patterns relevant for global deforestation. Global forest ecosystems have been chosen for this investigation because of their important role in the global carbon cycle and their importance for biological diversity. The resulting geographical patchwork of the combined dispositions and intensities of the different syndromes describes current and future regional threats to forests by their underlying global cause–effect patterns of civilisation–nature interaction.     

Genetic engineering and the dignity of creatures

The Swiss expert report suggests that the inherent dignity of a living being be identified with its inherent value. But the phrase “inherent value of a living being” seems to connote two concepts of inherent value. One has a morally obligating character but is counterintuitive because of its egalitarianism. The other is one of non-moral value. It is more compatible with considered intuitions but insufficient for substantiating the expert report’s claim that human beings have moral duties towards animals and plants. The paper discusses these concepts. Consideration is then given to the problem of how discursive support can be generated for the expert report’s claim that human beings have the moral duty to abstain from impairing those functions and abilities of a non-human being that members of its species as a rule can practice.     

Food, Consumer Concerns, and Trust: Food Ethics for a Globalizing Market

The use of biotechnology in food productiongives rise to consumer concerns. The term ``consumerconcern' is often used as a container notion. Itincludes concerns about food safety, environmental andanimal welfare consequences of food productionsystems, and intrinsic moral objections againstgenetic modification. In order to create clarity adistinction between three different kinds of consumerconcern is proposed. Consumer concerns can be seen assigns of loss of trust. Maintaining consumer trustasks for governmental action. Towards consumerconcerns, governments seem to have limitedpossibilities for public policy. Under current WTOregulations designed to prevent trade disputes,governments can only limit their policies to 1) safetyregulation based upon sound scientific evidence and 2)the stimulation of a system of product labeling. Ananalysis of trust, however, can show that ifgovernments limit their efforts in this way, they willnot do enough to avoid the types of consumer concernsthat diminish trust. The establishment of a technicalbody for food safety – although perhaps necessary –is in itself not enough, because concerns that relatedirectly to food safety cannot be solved by ``pure'science alone. And labeling can only be a good way totake consumer concerns seriously if these concerns arerelated to consumer autonomy. For consumer concernsthat are linked to ideas about a good society,labeling can only provide a solution if it is seen asan addition to political action rather than as itssubstitution. Labeling can help consumers take uptheir political responsibility. As citizens, consumershave certain reasonable concerns that can justifiableinfluence the market. In a free-market society, theyare, as buyers, co-creators of the market, andsocietal steering is partly done by the market.Therefore, they need the information to co-create thatmarket. The basis of labeling in these cases, however,is not the good life of the individual but thepolitical responsibility people have in their role asparticipants in a free-market. Then, public concernsare taken seriously. Labeling in that case does nottake away the possibilities of reaching politicalgoals, but it adds a possibility.     

Two concepts of dignity for humans and non-human organisms in the context of genetic engineering

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the Swiss Constitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations on the use of genetic material that take into account the dignity of nonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we should understand what is meant by “the dignity of nonhuman animals,” and about what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignity with respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determining what is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when applied to humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of human dignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the right not to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have the cognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the case of nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignity requires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied to their abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value is not absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibit breeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But it does restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard to genetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowed the uninhibited development of species specific functions, a position shared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purpose conception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-up position proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity, as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article. This paper is a slightly revised version of a paper that had been published in German in 1998 (“Menschenwürde vs. Würde der Kreatur,” Freiburg i.Br.).     

Place experience, gestalt, and the human–nature relationship

This paper explores some ways in which differing views about the human–nature relationship reflect and are reflected in people's experiences of the places and environments they encounter in their lives. I first describe how ideas of humans being “part of” versus “apart from” nature have appeared in discussions of environmental ethics and management, and suggest how these contrasting views might relate to people's actual experiences of the natural and human aspects of places. Using qualitative survey responses about outdoor places in the midwestern USA to illustrate ideas from phenomenological and gestalt psychology, I show how a sense of the human–nature relationship is conveyed in the gestalt qualities of places and how this may give rise to a feeling of moral responsibility toward nature. I conclude that the experience of human and natural aspects of real places points toward a dialectical view of the human–nature relationship, in which humans can be seen as simultaneously “part of” and “apart from” nature.     

Obligations to animals are based on rights

Some feminist philosophers criticize the idea of human rights because, they allege, it encapsulates male bias; it is therefore misguided, in their view, to extend moral rights to non-human animals. I argue that the feminist criticism is misguided. Ideas are not biased in favour of men simply because they originate with men, nor are ideas themselves biased in favour of men because men have used them prejudicially. As for the position that women should abandon theories of rights and embrace an ethic that emphasizes care: women who made this choice would not so much liberate themselves from the patriarchy as they would conform to its representation of women as emotional, subjective and irrational. There is, then, no good reason to withhold ascribing rights to non-human animals, based on the criticisms of rights made by some feminists.Some of the material in the discussion of the feminist critique of rights originally appeared in my The Case for Animal Rights: A Decade's Passing inA Quarter Century of Value Inquiry: Presidential Addresses of the American Society of Value Inquiry, edited by Richard T. Hull, pp. 451–455. Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1994. These passages are reprinted with the permission of the editor and publisher, whose thoughtful co-operation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Organic carbon diminution and estimates of carbon dioxide release from plantation soil

Summary This paper evaluates the rates of organic carbon diminution in the soil under monospecific tree plantations of teak, gmelina, rubber, oil palm, cashew and coffee. The differences between the organic carbon status of their soils and soil under nearby natural rain forest vegetation are compared. Annual rates of organic carbon decrease for the 0–10 cm soil layer, varied from 82.1 kg ha^–1 for cashew to 316.7 kg ha^–1 for oil palm. The tree plantations appear to release more carbon dioxide from the soil into the atmosphere than the natural forest. They therefore, appear to have the potential of contributing towards global warming — a threat they are supposed to mitigate.     

Environmental damage — environmental expenditure 2: Statistical evidence on the Federal Republic of Germany

Summary In part one of this paper (The Environmentalist,1990, pp.301–309) it was shown that conventional economic accounting does not reveal the actual damage to the natural environment, although an ever-increasing share of the Gross National Product is being spent for environmental protection activities. In this, part two of the paper, on the basis of acceptable conventions, the results of an empiric research on defensive expenditures in the GNP are presented, again taking the Federal Republic of Germany as an example. The authors would like to see more research of this type in order to understand better the environmental impacts and the structural deficiencies of modern industrial society. Dr Christian Leipert and Professor Udo E. Simonis have contributed frequently toThe Environmentalist (see 1989, pp.171–183; 1990, pp.25–38; 1990, pp.301–309). Dr Leipert is research fellow, Dr Simonis is research professor at the environmental policy unit of the Science Center Berlin.     

Three Egyptian industrial wastewater management programmes

A pre-treatment programme for wastewater from factories, representing three main industrial sectors in Egypt, has been developed. The first case study was a factory producing potato-chips. Wastewater discharged from this factory was characterized by high values of BOD, SS and oil and grease (6000 mgO₂ l^–1, 6577 mg l^–1 and 119 mg l^–1 respectively). Chemical treatment using lime and lime aided by polyelectrolyte achieved good results. Residual values of BOD and SS after treatment were 97 mg l^–1 and 49 mg l^–1, respectively. Oil and grease concentrations were reduced by 91 percent. Treatment via activated sludge at a detention time of 4 hrs produced good quality effluent. The second case study was an automobile company, representing the metal finishing industry. Analyses of wastewater samples from the degreasing, phosphating and painting departments, as well as the end-of-pipe effluent were conducted. The end-of-pipe effluent contained high concentrations of oil and grease (366 mg l^–1), phosphorous (111 mg l^–1) and zinc (81 mg l^–1). Chemical treatment of end-of-pipe wastewater using ferric chloride aided by lime, produced high quality effluent. The third sector was the chemical industry. For this purpose a paint factory was selected. Characteristics of raw wastewater varied widely according to the production rate. Average values of COD and BOD were 1950 mg l^–1 and 683 mg l^–1. Oil and grease ranged from 63 to 1624 mg l^–1. Chemical treatment using ferric chloride in combination with lime at the optimum operating conditions achieved good results. Residual values after treatment of COD, BOD and oil and grease reached 120, 36 and 8.6 mg l^–1, respectively. An engineering design for each case study has been prepared.     

The Reintroduction and Reinterpretation of the Wild

This paper is concerned with changing social representations of the ``wild,' in particular wild animals. We argue that within a contemporary Western context the old agricultural perception of wild animals as adversarial and as a threat to domestication, is being replaced by an essentially urban fascination with certain emblematic wild animals, who are seen to embody symbols of naturalness and freedom. On closer examination that carefully mediatized ``naturalness' may be but another form of domestication. After an historical overview of the human-animal, domestic-wild construction, an anthropological approach is used to interpret the social representation of wild animals held by different social actors – farmers, hunters, and tourists – within the context of an inhabited National Park, that of the Cévennes in south east France. Within the Park, the domestic and the wild, along with agriculture, hunting, conservation, re-introduced wild animals, and tourists co-habit. It is argued that changes in the representation of ``wildness' may well be an important indicator ofchanges in the social representation of nature.     

Transforming the Integrated Conservation and Development Project (ICDP) Approach: Observations from the Ranomafana National Park Project, Madagascar

Preservation of the biological diversity and ecosystems in protected areas can be achieved through projects linking conservation of the protected areas with improved standards of living for resident peoples within surrounding buffer zones. This is the hypothetical claim of the integrated conservation and development project (ICDP) approach to protected area management. This paper, based on several years of experience with the Ranomafana National Park Project in Madagascar, questions the major assumptions of this approach from ethical and practical perspectives. The four basic strategies available to ICDPs – protected areas, buffer zones, compensation, and economic development – are analyzed and shown to be deficient or untested in the case of Ranomafana. Recommendations are made to explore conservation models other than the western conception of the national park, to modify the notion of a buffer zone outside the protected area, to redistribute money or other resources directly to the poor people living in and around the protected areas, and to eliminate the middle men in the development business. An appeal is made to focus on local education, organization and discipline in order to promote self-determination and self-reliance among resident peoples of protected areas. The paper argues that a public works program, similar to the Roosevelt administration's Civilian Conservation Corps of the 1930s, funded through a hard-currency endowment or other innovative financing mechanism, should be tried as a replacement for the currently questionable ICDP approach at Ranomafana.     

Critical Anthropomorphism and Animal Ethics

Anthropomorphism has long been considered a cardinal error when describing animals. Ethicists have feared the consequences of misrepresenting animals in their reasoning. Recent research within human-animal studies, however, has sophisticated the notion of anthropomorphism. It is suggested that avoiding anthropomorphism merely creates other morphisms, such as mechanomorphism. Instead of avoiding anthropomorphism, it is argued that it is a communicative strategy that should be used critically. Instances of anthropomorphism in animal ethics are analyzed in this paper. Some analogies made between people and non-human animals in present theories of animal ethics are clear instances of psychological anthropomorphism. Other analogies are implicit cases of cultural anthropomorphism. It is argued that animal ethics needs to take the wider discourse of critical anthropomorphism into account in order to sophisticate the understanding and use of anthropomorphic projections. Anthropomorphism is an efficient tool of communication, and it may be made an adequate one as well.     

Circuit riding for managing small community sewage systems

Providing wastewater treatment services for small communities can be expensive, so many communities have chosen part-time or inadequately trained operators. This can result in neglect and poor plant performance. Indiana County, Pennsylvania, in the USA, has established an authority to provide operation and maintenance through a circuit riding arrangement. Two operators travel to eight plants five days a week. This has resulted in more consistent operation and maintenance at affordable rates. Homeowners pay $12.60–$18.00 and commercial customers pay $25–$150 a month. Even with regular attention, these small plants are not able to meet their effluent requirements at all times.     

A Baseline Study on Water Resources of the Tourist Island, Pulau Perhentian, Peninsular Malaysia, from an Ecological Perspective

Ambient water quality and bacterial populations in the water resources of Pulau Perhentian, a Marine Park of Malaysia, were studied during a peak tourist arrival, off-monsoon period. The overall water and bacteriological quality of swimming/boating sites in the island is at an acceptable condition, although the conductivity (0.88–60 mS m^–1) due to high dissolved solid concentrations is slightly high, when compared with the recommended standard and published guidelines for the protection/maintenance of recreation water and its aesthetic enjoyment (Universiti Malaya, Department of Environment, Malaysia, 1986). However, the bacteriological quality of the drinking/bathing water wells is poor, with faecal coliform counts (2 up to 1,600 MPN per 100 ml sample water) exceeding the permissible levels defined for raw water supplies (with or without treatment). This suggests that the groundwater, seepage and run-off into the wells is contaminated. Contrary to the belief of the water users being interviewed in a social survey, the untreated drinking/bathing water is not bacteria-free. The excessive counts are attributable to deoxygenated conditions (12–42 percent corresponding to 0.9–3.3 mg l^–1) prevailing in the wells, high total suspended solids (up to 202 mg l^–1) which promote bacterial growth, lack of adequate sewerage systems to receive effluents from lavatories of dwellings, chalets and resorts, as well as the lack of centralised water treatment plants and storage tanks to cope with water scarcity and waterway contamination.     

The environmental impact of a chloro-alkali factory in a river basin in Eastern India

Summary It has been established that the electrodes of the dialyser in a chloro-alkali plant in Eastern India release mercury beyond the permissible limits into the River Koel. Mercury in elemental form, as well as certain organo-mercury compounds, including methyl mercury, have been detected at a distance of 25 km from the discharge point. Even at a distance of 5–10 km, the mercury content of the sediment may be as high as 0.6–3.2 mg kg^–1 above the value of sediment upstream of the plant. This sediment itself is contaminated, probably by battery and paint factories, etc., still further upstream. Thus, the chloro-alkali factory has contributed 60–320 times above the permissible limit (0.01 mg kg^–1) of mercury release, at a distance of 5–10 km from the point of release. Furthermore, various phytoplankton and zooplankton have been contaminated, leading to very high mercury contents in certain fish. This food chain, therefore, threatens man himself.Dr Sajalendu Nanda is currently a Research Associate at Bangur Institute of Neurology in Calcutta. He possesses an MSc in Environmental Biology and a PhD in Ecology. His address for correspondence is c/o Dr P.K. Tapaswi, Professor-in-Charge at the Biological Sciences Division of the Indian Statistical Institute.     

In the midst of change

It is characteristic to be in the midst of change and not to recognize it. In retrospect 1970–72 at Clark University presaged a successful universalization of environmental perception, but it was a high point rather than a beginning in pursuit of the higher aspirations of the then-fledgling field. These aspirations—to solve practical problems, to develop a common methodology, to bridge the disciplines, and to develop or revise a theory—have never been fully realized. Widely accepted today, environmental perception and behavior mirrors the everyday differences within and between disciplines and thus is divided by theoretical ideology, substantive focus and views as to what constitutes data. As with the individual disciplines, I have successfully integrated environmental perception into my own work, moving it from the exceptional to the everyday, and with some regret, from the magic of 1970–72 to the science of today.     

Are Scientists Right and Non-Scientists Wrong? Reflections on Discussions of GM

The aim of this article is to further our understanding of the “GM is unnatural” view, and of the critical response to it. While many people have been reported to hold the view that GM is unnatural, many policy-makers and their advisors have suggested that the view must be ignored or rejected, and that there are scientific reasons for doing so. Three “typical” examples of ways in which the “GM is unnatural” view has been treated by UK policy-makers and their advisors are explored. These are the Government’s position (DEFRA Report), the account of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, and the position of Nigel Halford, a scientist with an advisory role to the Government. I show that their accounts fail to mount a convincing critique. Then, I draw on an empirical research project held during  2003–2004 at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne in the north east of England. Scientists met with non-scientists in a range of facilitated one-to-one conversations (“exchanges”) on various environmental issues, one of which was on GM. Our findings show that some scientists who rejected the “GM is unnatural” view struggled to do so consistently. Their struggle is interpreted in terms of a conflict between a so-called “scientific” worldview, and a different worldview that underlies the concerns of those who held the “GM is unnatural” view. This worldview is explored further by an examination of their concerns. What distinguishes this worldview from the “scientific” worldview is that the instrumentalization of the nonhuman world is questioned to a larger extent. I conclude that, because the underlying concerns of those who held the “GM is unnatural” view were not with GM as such, yet with a worldview that was considered to be problematic, and of which many GM applications were held to be expressions, policy-makers and their advisors should reflect on the critical worldview of those who claim that GM is unnatural if they want to engage seriously with their concerns.