排污权交易机制在山西省的探索与实践

排污权交易制度是一项需要探索的引入了利益激励的新制度,本文着重介绍了山西省在排污权交易工作中的探索成果。对排污权交易机构的设立、区域排污权总数量的确定及企业初始排污权的核定、交易价格计量单位和排污权获得后拥有年限、排污权交易的保护价格、可出让排污权及政府储备排污权、跨区域交易原则、排污权退市以及促使现有企业进入购买排污权队列等问题做了详细阐述。     

我国排污权交易政策及完善对策研究

排污权交易在环境管理领域里正受到越来越多的关注。回顾了我国近年来的排污权交易政策,并对排污权交易试点实施效果进行了阐述,同时结合目前排污权交易在我国应用和研究现状,对排污权交易制度在实践过程中仍存在法律政策落后、初始分配公平与效率缺乏保障、市场体制欠缺以及监测监督力度不够等主要问题进行分析,并从排污立法、市场培育、政府监管3个方面提出政策建议。     

Where Did the Agricultural Nonpoint Source Trades Go? Lessons from Virginia Water Quality Trading Programs

Governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and agricultural organizations promote water quality trading programs as an innovative policy to engage agricultural producers in conservation activities. Cost analyses suggest regulated sources can reduce compliance costs by purchasing agricultural nonpoint source credits. Yet, such “point‐nonpoint” trades are rare. This article assesses the demand for agricultural nonpoint sources in well‐developed nutrient trading programs in Virginia for industrial and municipal wastewater treatment plants, municipal stormwater programs, and land developers. Evidence suggests nutrient trading programs in Virginia will not stimulate investments in pollutant reduction practices on working agricultural lands. The lack of demand for agricultural nonpoint source credits can be attributed to a substantial degree to the design features and incentives present in multiple overlapping regulatory programs. The legal setting that dampens regulated source demand for nonpoint source credits in Virginia is broadly representative of conditions found elsewhere in the United States.     

POINT‐NONPOINT SOURCE WATER QUALITY TRADING: A CASE STUDY IN THE MINNESOTA RIVER BASIN1

ABSTRACT: Contrary to the general trend of only a few actual trades occurring within point‐nonpoint source water quality trading programs in the United States, two trading projects in the Minnesota River Basin, created under the provisions of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, have generated five major trades and numerous smaller ones. In this paper, these two projects are described to illustrate their origins, implementation, and results. It was found that several factors contributed to the relatively high number of trades in these projects, including the offsetting nature of the projects (hence a fixed number of credits that the point sources were required to obtain), readily available information on potential nonpoint source trading partners, and an effectively internal trading scheme used by one of the two projects. It was also found that long term structural pollution control measures, such as streambank stabilization, offered substantial cost savings over point source controls. Estimates of transaction costs showed that the total costs of the trading projects were increased by at least 35 percent after transaction costs were taken into account. Evidence also showed that in addition to pollution reduction, these two trading projects brought other benefits to the watershed, such as helping balance environmental protection and regional economic growth.     

The role of the CMEA's foreign trade monopolies in mineral markets

The business rationality of the CMEA mineral traders is bound by several characteristics of mineral production under central planning and by the mechanics of foreign trade monopoly. These characteristics include aspects such as: priority of national economic goals over trading strategies of the Foreign Trade Organisations (FTOs) in Eastern Europe; balance-of-payment problems; the organizational complexities and the weakness of the incentive mechanism, as well as the lack of an appropriate performance criterion. It is suggested that the 30 mineral trading FTOs in the CMEA tend to perform in a manner comparable to marketing departments of the Western mineral industries but are at a clear disadvantage when compared with ‘stand alone’ Western intermediaries making profits through risk taking and abhoring bureaucracy and rigidity in management.     

Tradable planning permits versus auctioned tradable development rights: different trading agents,different policy outcomes

The tradable planning permit (TPP) policy seeks to limit the land take by development. It can be used in countries where development rights are vested by land-use planning to certain landowners only. TPPs are traded among public authorities. We introduce here a new policy, called the auctioned tradable development rights (ATDR) policy, which takes advantage of unvested rights of development and of trading among private actors. We compare the TPP, the ATDR policy and our baseline land-use planning model using a set of criteria. There are trade-offs within compared models. Both trading policies extend opportunities for land protection from development in exchange for higher transaction costs (highest in the ATDR policy). Trading policies seek also to recapture a part of development rent, decrease rent-seeking, and locate new development more effectively from the investors' perspective. However, trading among public authorities in the TPP model may hinder attaining these effects.     

An alternative role for economic instruments: Sustainable finance for environmental management

Economic instruments, such as effluent fees and tradable discharge permits (TDP), have often been suggested by economists as efficient or cost-effective means to control pollution. In recent years such instruments have received increasing attention due to their growing political acceptability. Still, their use in practice has been tentative. The interest in possible application of such instruments has led to a set of studies regarding their practical potential. These studies indicate that economic instruments require substantial government involvement, entailing high administration cost; require restrictions so as to prevent significant deterioration in receptor areas; and have ambivalent effects on innovation adoption. Consequently, the efficiency gains from such instruments may be smaller than potential gains identified in earlier studies. In addition, the distributional impacts of such instruments and their possible adverse effect on market contestability reduce their attractiveness in some cases. These findings raise the question: what is the desired role of economic instruments in addressing environmental concerns? In recent years the demand for environmental services has increased dramatically. Current legislation and studies indicate that desired environmental expenditures are likely to increase. At the same time environmental programs face increasing competition from other programs for a declining pool of general revenues. One outcome of these processes has been the search for alternative sources of funds for environmental programs. Furthermore, as the competition for general revenue funds increases, the allocation of such funds for environmental programs becomes less predictable. This may endanger many long-term environmental programs that require stable funding. This article suggests that economic instruments may prove one source of dedicated funds for many environmental goals. Consequently, studies of environmental-program financing as well as studies of economic instruments may well explore the possible role of economic instruments as financing tools. Some examples of the potential of such tools for estuary cleanup programs are discussed.     

排污权交易及其应用探讨

排污权交易在环境管理领域里正受到越来越多的关注。文章回顾了排污权交易在国内外的发展历程，利用经济学原理，对排行权交易理论和市场优化机制进行了阐述，综合介绍了实施排污权交易的步骤与必要性等问题，同时结合我国的具体国情和污染特征，对在我国组建排污权交易市场实施排污权交易进行了可行性分析，并基于目前排污权交易在我国应用和研究的现状，提出了在今后工作中应注意的几个问题。     

Policy Utopias for Nutrient Credit Trading Programs with Nonpoint Sources

A promising program to address water contamination from nutrients is water quality trading (WQT), whereby entities with high abatement costs purchase credits from entities with lower abatement costs. The concept has found some success with point source water pollution, but very few trades have occurred in over 50 programs in the United States (U.S.) that have focused on nonpoint sources (NPSs). To understand why success has been slow, we identified three environments needed for programs to succeed: physical, economic, and institutional. We estimate that only 5% of watersheds in the U.S. currently listed as nutrient impaired provide a viable physical environment for trading nitrogen; 13% are suitable for phosphorus. Economic and institutional challenges would shrink that domain even further. Therefore, we find places with the ideal physical, economic, and institutional environments necessary for feasible WQT programs are virtual policy utopias — rare places with ideal environments. Fortunately, a growing literature provides the tools necessary to identify where these policy utopias are and to expand that domain through a better understanding about how to manage WQT programs more effectively.     

Achieving Nutrient Water Quality Goals: Bringing Market‐Like Principles to Water Quality Management*1

Abstract: Market‐like trading programs for water quality management begin with enforceable limits on the amount of the pollutant allowed in a watershed. Properly designed market‐like trading programs then create incentives for dischargers to reduce nutrient control costs over time by making pollution prevention innovations. However, the structure of the Clean Water Act can be a barrier to establishing market‐like trading programs. First, we describe the general features and advantages of market‐like trading programs. Then we offer practical suggestions for bringing market‐like design concepts to nutrient trading programs within the existing legal and regulatory setting.     

The political economy of certificates for land use in Germany – experimental evidence

Certificate trading schemes have been discussed as a cost-efficient means of reducing urban land consumption in Germany by capping and reallocating permissions to conduct building projects. However, in contrast to the established cap & trade systems for emissions, reputation-seeking politicians would be in charge of buying and trading certificates – an aspect not considered to date. We thus present a laboratory experiment that captures politicians’ incentives connected to electoral cycles in a cap & trade scheme for land consumption, whereby tradable certificates are auctioned and grandfathered in equal shares. We find the cap & trade system to be efficient at large; yet, there are several politically relevant distortions that are aggravated by self-serving incentives. We thus identify potential problems to a cap & trade system for urban land consumption that could substantially reduce both its assumed superior efficiency and its political feasibility.     

COST‐EFFECTIVE POINT‐NONPOINT TRADING: AN APPLICATION TO THE SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN1

ABSTRACT: Point‐nonpoint trading has been suggested as a relatively efficient approach for reducing nutrient pollution in the Chesapeake Bay and elsewhere. However, relatively little economic research has examined the design of trading programs involving nonpoint sources. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the economics of several fundamental design choices for point‐nonpoint trading programs. The Susquehanna River Basin (SRB) in Pennsylvania as an example, although many of the insights should generally apply to other regions as well.     

Point‐Nonpoint Trading – Can It Work?1

Ribaudo, Marc O. and Jessica Gottlieb, 2011. Point‐Nonpoint Trading – Can It Work? Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):5‐14. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00454.x Abstract: Water quality trading between point and nonpoint sources is of great interest as an alternative to strict command and control regulations on point sources for achieving water quality goals. The expectation is that trading will reduce the costs of water quality protection, and may speed compliance. The United States Environmental Protection Agency has issued guidance to the States on developing point‐nonpoint trading programs, and United States Department of Agriculture is encouraging farmer participation. However, existing point‐nonpoint trading programs have resulted in very few trades. Supply side and demand side impediments seem to be preventing trades from occurring in most trading programs. These include uncertainty over the number of discharge allowances different management practices can produce, high transactions costs of identifying trading partners, baseline requirements that eliminate low‐cost credits, the reluctance of point sources to trade with unfamiliar agents, and the perception of some farmers that entering contracts with regulated point sources leads to greater scrutiny and potential future regulation. Many of these problems can be addressed through research and program design.     

Indicators of carbon storage in U.S. ecosystems: baseline for terrestrial carbon accounting

Policymakers, program managers, and landowners need information about net terrestrial carbon sequestration in forests, croplands, grasslands, and shrublands to understand the cumulative effects of carbon trading programs, expanding biofuels production, and changing environmental conditions in addition to agricultural and forestry uses. Objective information systems that establish credible baselines and track changes in carbon storage can provide the accountability needed for carbon trading programs to achieve durable carbon sequestration and for biofuels initiatives to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions. A multi-sector stakeholder design process was used to produce a new indicator for the 2008 State of the Nation's Ecosystems report that presents metrics of carbon storage for major ecosystem types, specifically change in the amount of carbon gained or lost over time and the amount of carbon stored per unit area (carbon density). These metrics have been developed for national scale use, but are suitable for adaptation to multiple scales such as individual farm and forest parcels, carbon offset markets and integrated national and international assessments. To acquire the data necessary for a complete understanding of how much, and where, carbon is gained or lost by U.S. ecosystems, expansion and integration of monitoring programs will be required.     

THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF WATER QUALITY TRADING MARKETS1

ABSTRACT: The use of transferable discharge permits in water pollution, what we will call water quality trading (WQT), is rapidly growing in the U.S. This paper reviews the current status of WQT nationally and discusses the structures of the markets that have been formed. Four main structures are observed in such markets: exchanges, bilateral negotiations, clearinghouses, and sole source offsets. The goals of a WQT program are environmental quality and cost effectiveness. In designing a WQT market, policy makers are constrained by legal restrictions and the physical characteristics of the pollution problem. The choices that must be made include how trading will be authorized, monitored and enforced. How these questions are answered will help determine both the extent to which these goals are achieved, and the market structures that can arise. After discussing the characteristics of different market structures, we evaluate how this framework applies in the case of California's Grassland Drainage Area Tradable Loads Program.     

An Ex Post Evaluation of Ohio’s Great Miami Water Quality Trading Program1

Newburn, David A. and Richard T. Woodward, 2011. An Ex Post Evaluation of Ohio’s Great Miami Water Quality Trading Program. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 48(1): 156‐169. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2011.00601.x Abstract: Market‐based approaches to address water quality problems have resulted in only limited success, especially in trading programs involving both point and nonpoint sources. We analyze one of the largest point‐nonpoint trading programs – the Great Miami Trading Program in Ohio, administered by the Miami Conservancy District (MCD). Our evaluation focuses on the economic and institutional aspects of the program, including cost effectiveness, efficiency of bidding, transaction costs, trading ratios, and innovation. We use a unique dataset consisting of all bids from agricultural nonpoint sources and interviews of soil and water conservation district (SWCD) agents in the watershed. We find that the MCD’s reliance on county‐level SWCD offices to recruit and advise farmers has been essential to achieve relatively high rates of farmer participation. Additionally, the MCD is able to partly free ride on the administrative costs that SWCD offices receive to assist federal conservation programs, which is helpful to lower costs for a fledgling trading program. However, the involvement of SWCD offices reduced the potential cost savings from the reverse auction structure because some agents were able to learn about the threshold price over the six rounds of bidding and help farmers bid strategically. Overall, the program structure serves as an effective model for future trading programs in other regions that seek to involve agricultural nonpoint sources.     

太湖流域水污染权交易制度比较分析——基于环湖六市的调研

太湖流域作为全国经济发达的地区之一,水环境污染成为制约太湖流域可持续发展的重要因素。同时作为水污染权交易制度实施最早的流域,该制度在太湖流域理论与实践层面探索经验的总结对排污许可制度的应用和排污权交易的推广有着重要的理论意义和紧迫的现实意义。本文通过对嘉兴、湖州、苏州、无锡、常州及上海地方经验的调研,从制度设计、产权界定、信息披露、制度效率等方面进行比较分析,发现市场主导型的水污染权交易模式可以显著提高政策绩效,而交易市场的规模是交易制度推广实施的关键,最后,提出建立太湖流域统一水污染权交易市场等的政策建议。     

A Watershed Approach to Improve Water Quality: Case Study of Clean Water Services’ Tualatin River Program1

Cochran, Bobby and Charles Logue, 2011. A Watershed Approach to Improve Water Quality: Case Study of Clean Water Services’ Tualatin River Program. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):29‐38. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00491.x Abstract: Over the last five years, Clean Water Services developed and implemented a program to offset thermal load discharged from its wastewater facilities to the Tualatin River by planting trees to shade streams and augmenting summertime instream flows. The program has overcome challenges facing many of the nation’s water quality trading programs to not only gain consensus on the frameworks needed to authorize trading, but also provide a broad range of ecosystem services. This paper compares the Tualatin case study with some of the commonly cited factors of successful trading programs.     

碳排放交易制度下城市减排的机会成本研究——基于中国碳排放试点城市的实证检验

作为全球气候治理的重要手段,碳排放交易制度受到了广泛的关注与讨论。基于此,本文采用我国2010-2016年城市面板数据,运用非参数方法构建方向性环境距离函数测算了2009-2015年城市减排的机会成本,计算结果显示,试点地区与非试点地区的碳排放的机会成本整体表现为上升的趋势,且试点地区的碳排放的机会成本总体低于非试点地区。在测算城市减排机会成本的基础上,运用双重差分法来检验碳排放交易制度的有效性。经检验发现：碳排放交易制度有利于降低城市减排的机会成本,然而由于碳排放交易制度还存在碳排放权初始分配制度缺失、碳排放交易制度的定价机制扭曲等问题,因此其对降低城市减排的机会成本作用较小,并且进一步通过对政策时间趋势的分析得出政策效应随时间推移而逐渐减弱。     

Policy Integration as a Success Factor for Emissions Trading

Emissions trading will not be able to become the single instrument of a national climate policy because of costs for monitoring of greenhouse gases and transfers of allowances. Thus, it is important to assess optimal ways of integrating emissions trading into national climate policy mixes, thus leading to a more efficient policy, especially by allowing the use of transboundary transactions. The implemented trading systems of the UK and Denmark, the agreed EU one, and the planned ones of Norway are used as case studies. In the UK, the introduction of an energy tax on industry was the catalyst that led to the development of emissions trading, voluntary agreements, and two subsidy programs. However, in Denmark trading was limited in scope and not integrated with the successful emission tax. The EU and Norwegian trading schemes both have a large scope and integrate international transfers; the former is integrated with other instruments to avoid free riding. Policy integration will thus enhance the efficiency improvements that emissions trading can introduce.