排污交易权理论与实践探讨

排污权交易是一种市场激励机制。本文通过对排污权交易进行理论和实践的分析和探讨，提出在我国实施总量控制条件下的排污权交易是切实可行的，其关键在于建立起完整、合理的排污权交易市场体系。     

我国排污权交易政策及完善对策研究

排污权交易在环境管理领域里正受到越来越多的关注。回顾了我国近年来的排污权交易政策,并对排污权交易试点实施效果进行了阐述,同时结合目前排污权交易在我国应用和研究现状,对排污权交易制度在实践过程中仍存在法律政策落后、初始分配公平与效率缺乏保障、市场体制欠缺以及监测监督力度不够等主要问题进行分析,并从排污立法、市场培育、政府监管3个方面提出政策建议。     

我国排污权交易制度运行进展、挑战与对策研究

进一步调动市场的积极性、充分发挥市场机制在治污减排中的杠杆调节作用是“十四五”时期生态环境保护制度建设的重点。当前，我国排污权交易市场仍存在活跃性、稳定性较低、激励不足等问题。本文对我国排污权交易制度建立的历史进程进行了梳理，采用文本分析和文献计量的方法分析了我国排污权交易制度的实践和研究现状。在此基础上，进一步识别了我国排污权交易面临的问题与挑战，并提出改进排污权交易制度的思路与建议，包括建立统一市场、信息公开等。     

电力行业实行二氧化硫排污交易浅析

本文介绍了排污权交易在国内外的发展进程及现状。分析了我国电力行业实行二氧化硫排污交易的可行性，同时指出该交易体系目前存在的初始排污权分配、环境公平性、交易市场以及政府职能等问题；建议我国应在借鉴国外成功经验的基础上，结合我国实际情况逐步建立二氧化硫排污权交易的完整的市场体制，并完善相关政策，扩大交易范围。     

可交易排污权初始分配模式分析

从排污权交易基础理论出发，对国内外排污权初始分配模式进行了比较分析，并结合我国实际，得出我国应选择免费分配与公开拍卖相结合的分配模式。     

中国实施排污权交易制度的若干法律问题思考

文章分析了中国实施排污权交易制度的必要性,并就排污权交易的原则、主体资格取得、交易的范围、交易的监督管理和排污权交易的法律责任等几方面问题提出了立法完善的建议。     

建立PM2.5排污权交易框架的研究

化学需氧量、氨氮、二氧化硫、氮氧化物的排污权交易在我国已经开展试点工作,但是PM2.5排污权交易在我国尚未开展试点工作。本文根据国内外排污权交易的经验,以及其他污染物排放总量控制目标和我国的实际情况,分析了建立PM2.5排污权交易的必要性,并提出了初步构建PM2.5排污权交易的框架,为今后开展PM2.5排污权交易试点工作提供了理论基础。     

湖北省实施排污权交易的障碍及对策分析

湖北省排污权市场的交易频率与交易规模都亟待提高。本文选择全国首家排污权交易中心—嘉兴市排污权储备交易中心作为比较对象,分别从排污权的初始分配、交易制度设计和激励机制等三个方面对两地的具体做法进行了详细的分析比较,最后得出:湖北省在实施排污交易的过程中,初始排污权的分配难以体现公平与效率;集中竞价的交易方式并非当前的最优选择;重平台、忽激励的交易制度设计埋下了市场交易冷清的隐患。最后,提出了相应的改进建议。     

论排污权交易的缺失与环境法拓补

排污权交易是近年来国内外的热点话题，我国政府曾针对排污权交易广泛实践，在科学研究、试点、管理等方面做了大量的工作，并取得了可观的成绩和经验。但是，对其负面影响鲜有提及，缺乏及时和必要的立法准备。本文试图结合这一现状进行探索性的研究。     

论排污权的法律属性

论文针对排污权交易试点工作中对排污权法律属性认知模糊、进而阻碍了这一环境经济政策进一步深化的问题,从民事权利谱系和排污权交易制度设计的价值追求两个方面剖析了排污权的法律属性。主要结论:排污权不等于环境容量使用权;排污权是基于行政许可的有限授权,这种许可不构成一种产权;排污指标是行政许可的随附义务,是对排污权的限制,而不是权利本身。     

THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF WATER QUALITY TRADING MARKETS1

ABSTRACT: The use of transferable discharge permits in water pollution, what we will call water quality trading (WQT), is rapidly growing in the U.S. This paper reviews the current status of WQT nationally and discusses the structures of the markets that have been formed. Four main structures are observed in such markets: exchanges, bilateral negotiations, clearinghouses, and sole source offsets. The goals of a WQT program are environmental quality and cost effectiveness. In designing a WQT market, policy makers are constrained by legal restrictions and the physical characteristics of the pollution problem. The choices that must be made include how trading will be authorized, monitored and enforced. How these questions are answered will help determine both the extent to which these goals are achieved, and the market structures that can arise. After discussing the characteristics of different market structures, we evaluate how this framework applies in the case of California's Grassland Drainage Area Tradable Loads Program.     

Water Quality Trading with Lumpy Investments,Credit Stacking,and Ancillary Benefits

This paper studies the economics of a water quality trading market in a predominantly agricultural watershed, and explores the effects of credit stacking in such a market when buyers and sellers of pollution credits can only reduce pollution with large, discrete investments that yield discontinuous supply and demand. The research simulates hypothetical water quality trading markets in the corn‐belt area of Illinois, where wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) can pay farmers to reduce nutrients by installing wetlands and farmers may or may not be allowed to earn payments for multiple services from one wetland. We find that wetlands are a more cost‐effective way to mitigate nitrogen pollution than abatement by WWTPs. Stacking credits may improve social welfare while providing more ecosystem services if there is enough demand for the primary credit in the market (nitrogen) to cover most of the cost of installing the wetland but the supply of nitrogen credits is not exhausted. However, in the presence of lumpy pollution reduction activities, the effects of allowing stacked credit sales are idiosyncratic and not necessarily positive; stacked payments may or may not satisfy additionality. The results imply that credit trading for nitrogen is likely to make society better off, but the effects of allowing farmers to receive multiple payments from a single wetland depend on details of the situation.     

REGULATING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION IN SURFACE WATERS: A PROPOSAL1

ABSTRACT: Nonpoint sources (NPS) are an important and continuing source of toxic and conventional pollutants to surface waters. The Clean Water Act amendments of 1987 call for the regulation of these sources through the use of Best Management Practices (BMP). However, BMP implementation has generally occurred on a voluntary basis. This paper proposes a regulatory mechanism to control nonpoint source pollution. The regulatory mechanism involves the development of consortia, made up of all parties potentially responsible for NPS pollution, the development of wasteload allocations that coordinate the pollutant contributions from both point and nonpoint sources in a stream segment, and the issuance of permits to consortia to regulate the impacts of NPS pollution and ensure achievement of state or federal Water Quality Criteria and Standards.     

POINT‐NONPOINT SOURCE WATER QUALITY TRADING: A CASE STUDY IN THE MINNESOTA RIVER BASIN1

ABSTRACT: Contrary to the general trend of only a few actual trades occurring within point‐nonpoint source water quality trading programs in the United States, two trading projects in the Minnesota River Basin, created under the provisions of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, have generated five major trades and numerous smaller ones. In this paper, these two projects are described to illustrate their origins, implementation, and results. It was found that several factors contributed to the relatively high number of trades in these projects, including the offsetting nature of the projects (hence a fixed number of credits that the point sources were required to obtain), readily available information on potential nonpoint source trading partners, and an effectively internal trading scheme used by one of the two projects. It was also found that long term structural pollution control measures, such as streambank stabilization, offered substantial cost savings over point source controls. Estimates of transaction costs showed that the total costs of the trading projects were increased by at least 35 percent after transaction costs were taken into account. Evidence also showed that in addition to pollution reduction, these two trading projects brought other benefits to the watershed, such as helping balance environmental protection and regional economic growth.     

太湖流域水污染权交易制度比较分析——基于环湖六市的调研

太湖流域作为全国经济发达的地区之一,水环境污染成为制约太湖流域可持续发展的重要因素。同时作为水污染权交易制度实施最早的流域,该制度在太湖流域理论与实践层面探索经验的总结对排污许可制度的应用和排污权交易的推广有着重要的理论意义和紧迫的现实意义。本文通过对嘉兴、湖州、苏州、无锡、常州及上海地方经验的调研,从制度设计、产权界定、信息披露、制度效率等方面进行比较分析,发现市场主导型的水污染权交易模式可以显著提高政策绩效,而交易市场的规模是交易制度推广实施的关键,最后,提出建立太湖流域统一水污染权交易市场等的政策建议。     

INCREASING REGULATORS' CONFIDENCE IN POINT-NONPOINT POLLUTANT TRADING SCHEMES1

ABSTRACT: One of the principal stumbling blocks to regulatory agencies' adopting pollutant trading schemes is the complex of uncertainties surrounding any change in institutions. This is especially true if nonpoint pollution sources are to be involved along with point sources. Regulators are understandably reluctant to switch from tried-and-true point source permit systems, even if trading schemes can be shown (on paper, at least) to result in lower public expenditures. We propose a set of practical criteria for point-nonpoint pollutant trading systems that promise to increase regulators' confidence that the new system will be equally effective in controlling pollution and at the same time more likely to capture efficiencies in pollution reduction practices.     

不完全竞争行业中的环境工具有效性研究:一个理论框架

各级政府贯彻落实绿色发展的理念,实现经济增长与环境保护的共赢,才能真正实现"绿水青山就是金山银山"。在经济"新常态"背景下,防治环境污染是个复杂而系统性的工程,需要进行经济追因与综合治理,其中,制定实施有效的环境政策工具尤为关键。本文把微观经济学中的双寡头产量竞争模型作为基准模型拓展用于环境经济分析,并把环境税、环境规制、排污权交易这三类主要环境工具对企业生产决策的影响纳入基准模型,旨在对比研究不完全竞争行业中环境工具的有效性问题。结果表明:主要基于市场机制的环境经济政策比行政色彩浓厚的环境规制更有效率。提高环境税率或排污权价格均能显著削减行业污染物排放量,如果环境税率恰好等于排污权价格,则环境税与排污权交易这两类环境工具的效力相等。这对进一步建立和完善我国尚处于探索或初始实施阶段的环境工具,促进石化、电力、钢铁等不完全竞争行业的主要污染物减排,具有一定参考价值和借鉴意义。     

排污权交易管理信息系统设计

本文为我国的排污权交易设计了一套管理信息系统。该系统设计采用C/S和B/S混合架构体系,充分发挥了两者的长处。该系统一方面可以同时为环境管理部门、排污企业和社会公众三类主体提供信息化服务,大大方便了排污权的交易过程,并保证了排污权交易的公平与透明;另一方面可以使环境管理人员方便地查询和检索相关企业,简化了环境管理工作。