Flourishing Dogs: The Case for an Individualized Conception of Welfare and Its Implications

Martha Nussbaum argues that animals (including ourselves) are entitled to a flourishing life according to the norm for their species. Nussbaum furthermore suggests that in the case of dogs, breed norms as well as species norms are relevant. Her theses capture both common intuitions among laypeople according to which there is something wrong with the breeding of “unnatural” animals, or animals that are too different from their wild ancestors, and the dog enthusiast’s belief that dogs departing from the norms for their breed are tragic. I argue that the high diversity of the dog species and the ultimate arbitrariness of breed norms support the thesis that a conception of welfare must be tied to what the individual requires in order to flourish. In the second part of the paper, I discuss the implications that an individualized (but sufficiently sophisticated) welfare conception has for the breeding of dogs for conformation shows, for the pet market and for the performance of various tasks for which we need working dogs.     

Personalized Nutrition and Social Justice: Ethical Considerations Within Four Future Scenarios Applying the Perspective of Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach

The idea of personalized nutrition (PN) is to give tailored dietary advice based on personal health-related data, i.e. phenotoype, genotype, or lifestyle. PN may be seen as part of a general trend towards personalised health care and currently various types of business models are already offering such services in the market. This paper explores ethical issues of PN by examining how PN services within the contextual environment of four future scenarios about health and nutrition in Europe might affect aspects of social justice according to Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach. The scenarios have been created by a mixed group of stakeholders and experts in three consecutive workshops. This resulted in the definition of four future scenarios within a scenario space consisting of two variables: the ‘logic of health care systems’ and ‘conception of health’. Within each scenario, PN is likely to play a more or less important role in improving health by influencing food consumption patterns in society. Nussbaum’s capability approach implies a concept of social justice as a function of a minimum standard of human dignity. This denotes an account for equality in terms of a minimum of entitlements. However, also the ability of achieving individual objectives is essential for social justice. Personalisation advice in health and food consumption patterns, as aimed for by PN, is therefore acceptable provided a minimum of entitlements is guaranteed to all members of a society, and at the same time freedom concerning personal preferences is respected. Potential variation of how different people might benefit from PN should therefore be consistent with the minimum required as defined by the list of capabilities.     

Should the Lion Eat Straw Like the Ox? Animal Ethics and the Predation Problem

Stephen Clark’s article The Rights of Wild Things from 1979 was the starting point for the consideration in the animal ethics literature of the so-called ‘predation problem’. Clark examines the response of David George Ritchie to Henry Stephens Salt, the first writer who has argued explicitly in favor of animal rights. Ritchie attempts to demonstrate—via reductio ad absurdum—that animals cannot have rights, because granting them rights would oblige us to protect prey animals against predators that wrongly violate their rights. This article navigates the reader through the debate sparked off by Clarke’s article, with as final destination what I consider to be the best way to deal with the predation problem. I will successively discuss arguments against the predation reductio from Singer’s utilitarian approach, Regan’s deontological approach, Nussbaum’s capability approach, and Donadson and Kymlicka’s political theory of animal rights.     

Can Species Have Capabilities,and What if They Can?

In this article, I apply the environmental or expanded capabilities approach to species and examine whether species as wholes can have capabilities and what are the implications if they can. The examination provides support for the claim that species as evolutionary groups can possess capabilities. They have integrity, which refers to the functionings that enable the self-making and development (evolvement) of species, and it is conceptually possible to identify capabilities that essentially enable or contribute to species integrity. One central capability for species can be identified from conservation literature: adaptive capacity, the ability of species to react to environmental changes by self-regulative evolution. After constructing the main argument that species can have capabilities and that they possess the capability to adaptive capacity, I shortly expound on the implications of these claims. It turns out that there are at least three different ways to apply the notion, and that the claim ‘species have capabilities’ does not entail that species are necessarily recipients of justice.     

Patriotism as an Environmental Virtue

Define “patriotism” as love for one’s country and devotion to its well-being. This essay contends that patriotism thus defined is a virtue and that environmentalism is one of its most important manifestations. Patriotism, as devotion to particular places and people, can occur at various levels, from the local to the national. Knowing and caring about particular places and people and working to protect them is good for us and good for them and hence a good thing overall. Knowing and caring and working less on behalf of more remote places and people is also good, since it allows us to focus our efforts, act effectively, and do more good in the world. Philosophical analyses of patriotism by Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum are complemented by the more “down to earth” understanding of the virtue presented here. While patriotism’s dangers are undeniable, so are the dangers stemming from lack of patriotism. The proper answer to bad patriotism is not cosmopolitanism, but good patriotism: the kind illustrated by environmental activists.     

Beneath the Straw: In Defense of Participatory Adaptive Management

Our recent paper advocating adaptive management of invasive nonnative species (INS) in Kings Bay, Florida received detailed responses from both Daniel Simberloff, a prominent invasion biologist, and Mark Sagoff, a prominent critic of invasion biology. Simberloff offers several significant lines of criticism that compel detailed rebuttals, and, as such, most of this reply is dedicated to this purpose. Ultimately, we find it quite significant that Simberloff, despite his other stated objections to our paper, apparently agrees with our argument that proposals for alternative management of established INS (i.e., alternatives to minimization/eradication) should not be rejected on an a␣priori basis. We argue that more specific development and application of adaptive approaches toward INS management, whether in Kings Bay or other appropriate case studies, would be facilitated if ecosystem managers and invasion biologists follow Simberloff’s lead on this key point. While Sagoff largely shares (and, indeed, served as a primary source for developing) our general arguments that challenge common moral and scientific assumptions associated with invasion biology, he does question our suggestion that participatory adaptive management provides an appropriate framework for approaching environmental problems in which science and politics are inherently entangled. We attempt to answer this criticism through a brief sketch of what participatory adaptive management might look like for Kings Bay and how such an approach would differ from past management approaches.     

Response to “The Problem of the Question About Animal Ethics” by Michal Piekarski

In this brief article we reply to Michal Piekarski’s response to our article ‘Facing Animals’ published previously in this journal. In our article we criticized the properties approach to defining the moral standing of animals, and in its place proposed a relational and other-oriented concept that is based on a transcendental and phenomenological perspective, mainly inspired by Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida. In this reply we question and problematize Piekarski’s interpretation of our essay and critically evaluate “the ethics of commitment” that he offers as an alternative.     

Deep Ethology, Animal Rights, and the Great Ape/Animal Project: Resisting Speciesism and Expanding the Community of Equals

In this essay I argue that the evolutionary and comparative study of nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) cognition in a wide range of taxa by cognitive ethologists can readily inform discussions about animal protection and animal rights. However, while it is clear that there is a link between animal cognitive abilities and animal pain and suffering, I agree with Jeremy Bentham who claimed long ago the real question does not deal with whether individuals can think or reason but rather with whether or not individuals can suffer. One of my major goals will be to make the case that the time has come to expand. The Great Ape Project (GAP) to The Great Ape/Animal Project (GA/AP) and to take seriously the moral status and rights of all animals by presupposing that all individuals should be admitted into the Community of Equals. I also argue that individuals count and that it is essential to avoid being speciesist cognitivists; it really doesn't matter whether ‘dogs ape’ or whether ‘apes dog’ when taking into account the worlds of different individual animals. Narrow-minded primatocentrism and speciesism must be resisted in our studies of animal cognition and animal protection and rights. Line-drawing into ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ species is a misleading speciesist practice that should be vigorously resisted because not only is line-drawing bad biology but also because it can have disastrous consequences for how animals are viewed and treated. Speciesist line-drawing also ignores within species individual differences. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Frames and Ambivalence in Context: An Analysis of Hands-On Experts’ Perception of the Welfare of Animals in Traveling Circuses in The Netherlands

The results of an empirical study into the perceptions of “hands-on” experts concerning the welfare of (non-human) animals in traveling circuses in the Netherlands are presented. A qualitative approach, based on in-depth conversations with trainers/performers, former trainers/performers, veterinarians, and an owner of an animal shelter, conveyed several patterns in the contextual construction of perceptions and the use of dissonance reduction strategies. Perceptions were analyzed with the help of the Symbolic Convergence Theory and the model of the frame of reference, consisting of knowledge, convictions, values, norms, and interests. The study shows that the debate regarding animals in circuses in the Netherlands is centered on the level of welfare that is required; the importance of animal welfare is not disputed. Arguments that were used differed according to the respondents’ specific backgrounds and can be placed on a gradient ranging from the conviction that the welfare of animals in circuses is sufficiently warranted and both human and animal enjoy the performance (right end), to the conviction that animal welfare in circuses is negative, combined with the idea that the goal of entertaining people does not outweigh that (left end). The study confirms that perceptions reflect people’s contexts, though the variety in scopes suggests that the (inter)relations between people and their context are complex in nature. Evidence of cognitive dissonance was abundant. Coping strategies were found to be used more by respondents towards the right end of the gradient, suggesting that those respondents experience more ambivalence. This encountered pattern of association between position on the gradient and frequency of dissonance reduction strategies calls for further research on the type of ambivalent feelings experienced. The authors argue that, to come to an agreement about the welfare of animals in circuses, including the way this welfare should be guaranteed, stakeholders from different contexts need to engage in a dialogue in which a distance is taken from right/wrong-schemes and that starts from acceptance of dilemmas and ambiguity.     

碳中和背景下欧盟碳边境调节机制对我国的影响及对策分析

在全球碳中和的新形势下,欧盟委员会于2021年7月正式提出"碳边境调节机制"(CBAM)立法提案,并计划于2023年起实施。本文在总结立法提案关键要素的基础上,着重分析欧盟CBAM的合法性与合理性,研判可能对我国产生的潜在影响,并从国际国内层面提出对策建议。分析发现,欧盟采取"名义"碳市场的形式,初期将覆盖水泥、电力、化肥、钢铁和铝等5个行业,只核算产品生产过程的直接排放,暂不考虑间接排放,2023—2025年是过渡期,2026年开始正式实施。欧盟CBAM的合法性与合理性面临诸多挑战:不符合世界贸易组织国民待遇原则和最惠国待遇原则,但存在满足关税与贸易总协定例外条款的可能性;违反国际气候治理的共同但有区别的责任原则、公平原则和各自能力原则,也不符合公约关于国际贸易歧视或变相限制的条款;对解决碳泄漏问题和保护本土竞争力的作用有限;产品隐含碳核算和碳价确定是技术难点问题。影响评估发现,欧盟CBAM将使我国受影响部门的对欧出口总额降低11%~13%,出口成本增加1亿~3.05亿美元,其中约四分之三的成本将由钢铁行业承担,对贸易隐含碳的下降作用有待进一步考量;此外,欧盟CBAM将会影响多边国际气候谈判进程,也会对我国经济社会发展、国际贸易、产业转型、技术提升等方面产生间接影响。我国应在国际层面坚定在气候治理多边框架下解决碳泄露问题,探索提出中国方案;积极推进贸易自由化,提升我国贸易优势;加强中欧对话协商,避免CBAM成为中欧"绿色贸易壁垒"。在国内层面稳步加快全国碳排放权交易体系建设,夯实碳排放核算基础能力,加强科学研究与交流合作。     

Risk management is not enough: a conceptual model for resilience and adaptation-based vulnerability assessments

The US government has focused considerable attention on enhancing our society’s ability to protect critical systems and services from disruptive events. Over the past decade, federal agencies have bolstered their efforts to identify and minimize threats using traditional risk-based approaches such as continuity of operations and disaster risk reduction processes. However, these valuable risk identification and management tools are limited because they rely upon foreseeable factor analyses of steady-state systems with predictable hazard frequencies and severities. In assessing the capability of complex adaptive systems to cope with disruptions, an overemphasis upon engineering resilience through risk management and planning for what is predictable may cloud or detract from our efforts to better understand a system’s emergent capabilities to withstand disruptions that are unforeseeable. This article contends that augmenting traditional risk approaches through the incorporation of methodologies grounded in socio-ecological system (SES) resilience principles offers a potential avenue for improving our agencies’ abilities to assess and manage both known and unknown risks. We offer a notional rationale for broadening our examination of system vulnerabilities and present a conceptual model that combines engineering and SES resilience paradigms to facilitate the identification, assessment, and management of system vulnerabilities. The Military Installation Resilience Assessment model described herein applies risk and resilience principles to evaluate whole systems, focusing on interconnections and their functionality in facilitating response and adaptation.     

Two Concepts of Dignity for Humans and Non-Human Organisms in the Context of Genetic Engineering

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the SwissConstitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations onthe use of genetic material that take into account the dignity ofnonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we shouldunderstand what is meant by ``the dignity of nonhuman animals,' andabout what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignitywith respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determiningwhat is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when appliedto humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of humandignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the rightnot to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have thecognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the caseof nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignityrequires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied totheir abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value isnot absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibitbreeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But itdoes restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard togenetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowedthe uninhibited development of species specific functions, a positionshared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purposeconception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-upposition proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity,as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article.     

Assigning Degrees of Ease or Difficulty for Pet Animal Maintenance: The EMODE System Concept

Pet animal management is subject to varied husbandry practices and the resulting consequences often impact negatively on animal welfare. The perceptions held by someone who proposes to keep an animal regarding the ease or difficulty with which its biological needs can be provided for in captivity are key factors in whether that animal is acquired and how well or poorly it does. We propose a system to ‘score’ animals and assign them to categories indicating the ease or difficulty with which they can be kept as pets in accordance with welfare and public health and safety considerations. The ‘EMODE’ (‘Easy’, ‘Moderate’, ‘Difficult’, ‘Extreme’) system has two fundamental components: animal welfare—which considers the ‘five freedoms’ principles; and public health and safety—which considers management associated with risks from disease or injury to the keeper and to others. EMODE incorporates two tiers of assessment and guidance, and may offer a reasonable guide for the majority of relevant animals. EMODE Tier 1 provides a primary and general assessment of animals by class or group, and EMODE Tier 2 provides a secondary refined assessment of animals by species or breed. EMODE offers a user-friendly and versatile foundation concept for the future development of guidance for the layperson who may be considering acquiring a pet or for certain personnel when considering assigning species to restrictive lists of suitable animals, for example, ‘positive lists’ as used by governments to control animals in trade and keeping.     

A capabilities approach to the prioritization of critical infrastructure

As a consequence of the U.S. effort to increase infrastructure security and resilience, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other U.S. federal agencies have identified 16 critical infrastructure sectors that are considered vital to the nation’s well-being in terms of economic security, public health, and safety. However, there remains no articulated set of values that justify this particular list of infrastructure systems or how decision-makers might prioritize investments towards one critical sector over another during a crisis. To offer a more integrated and holistic approach to critical infrastructure resilience, this research employs the capabilities approach to human development, which offers an alternative view of critical infrastructure that focuses on the services that infrastructure provides rather than its physical condition or vulnerability to threats. This service-based perspective of infrastructure emphasizes the role of infrastructure in enabling and supporting central human capabilities that build adaptive capacity and improve human well-being. We argue that the most critical infrastructure systems are those that are essential for providing and/or supporting central human capabilities. This paper examines the DHS designation of criticality from a capabilities perspective and argues for a capabilities basis for making distinctions between those systems that should be considered most critical and those that might be temporarily sacrificed. A key implication of this work is that an across sector approach is required to reorganize existing critical infrastructure efforts around the most valuable infrastructure end-services.     

A Virtue of Precaution Regarding the Moral Status of Animals with Uncertain Sentience

We address the moral importance of fish, invertebrates such as crustaceans, snails and insects, and other animals about which there is qualified scientific uncertainty about their sentience. We argue that, on a sentientist basis, one can at least say that how such animals fare make ethically significant claims on our character. It is a requirement of a morally decent (or virtuous) person that she at least pays attention to and is cautious regarding the possibly morally relevant aspects of such animals. This involves having a moral stance, in the sense of patterns of perception, such that one notices such animals as being morally relevant in various situations. For the person who does not already consider these animals in this way, this could be a big change in moral psychology, and can be assumed to have behavioural consequences, albeit indeterminate. Character has been largely neglected in the literature, which focuses on act-centred approaches (i.e. that the evidence on sentience supports, or does not support, taking some specific action). We see our character-centred approach as complementary to, not superior to, act-centred approaches. Our approach has the advantage of allowing us to make ethically interesting and practically relevant claims about a wider range of cases, but it has the drawback of providing less specific action guidance.     

Two concepts of dignity for humans and non-human organisms in the context of genetic engineering

The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the Swiss Constitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations on the use of genetic material that take into account the dignity of nonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we should understand what is meant by “the dignity of nonhuman animals,” and about what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignity with respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determining what is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when applied to humans and when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of human dignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the right not to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have the cognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the case of nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignity requires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied to their abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value is not absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibit breeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But it does restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard to genetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowed the uninhibited development of species specific functions, a position shared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purpose conception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-up position proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity, as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article. This paper is a slightly revised version of a paper that had been published in German in 1998 (“Menschenwürde vs. Würde der Kreatur,” Freiburg i.Br.).     

The Five Freedoms of Animal Welfare are Rights

In this paper I defend a theory of welfare rights for nonhuman animals. I do this by demonstrating that a well-established framework for protecting the interests of farm animals, the ‘Five Freedoms of Animal Welfare’, is already functioning just as a set of rights. To support this claim I adopt a common approach to detecting evidence for deontological reasoning and look at the structural features of rights. I first consider Hohfeld’s system of legal rights and consider whether the Five Freedoms may be understood as liberties or claim rights, before making a more successful comparison with side constraints and an interest theory of rights as understood by Nozick and Raz. I also respond to a likely objection that it is not possible to have some welfare rights without a right to freedom from exploitation. The argument therefore contributes to breaking down the stubborn division between ‘animal welfare’ and ‘animal rights’.     

Genetically Engineered Animals,Drugs, and Neoliberalism: The Need for a New Biotechnology Regulatory Policy Framework

Genetically engineered (GE) animals that are meant for release in the wild could significantly impact ecosystems given the interwoven or entangled existence of species. Therefore, among other things, it is all too important that regulatory agencies conduct entity appropriate, rigorous risk assessments that can be used for informed decision-making at the local, national and global levels about the release of those animals in the wild. In the United States (US), certain GE animals that are intended for release in the wild may be regulated as new animal drugs by the Food and Drug Administration. This paper argues that the decision to treat them as new animal drugs is attributable to the influence of neoliberalism on the US biotechnology regulatory policy framework. The case is made that there should be public democratic deliberations and decision-making about the values and concerns that should guide the nation’s biotechnology regulatory policy paradigm, including the risk assessment process for GE animals meant for release in the wild.     

Intrinsic Value and Direct Duties: From Animal Ethics towards Environmental Ethics?

Three types of concern for animal welfare are widelyheld: Animals should feel well, they should function well, andthey should lead natural lives. The paper deals with a well-knownanswer to the question of why such concerns are morallyappropriate: Human beings have direct duties towards animals,because animals are beings that can flourish, the flourishing ofanimals is intrinsically or inherently valuable, and that whichis conducive to their flourishing is a legitimate object of moralconcern. Looking for a tenable conception of direct dutiestowards animals, the following questions are discussed: Whatshould we take it to mean that ``animal flourishing isintrinsically or inherently valuable?'' Under what conditions doesa living being's ability to flourish create direct duties towardsthis being? Is awareness or sentience required for there to bedirect duties towards a living being? Does such a requirementimply that moral concerns for animals would be limited to theirfeeling well, or does it also give way to having moral concernsfor their functioning well and leading natural lives? Can onetake into account considered judgements that claim that towardsdifferent animals we have moral duties that differ in kind and/orstrength? If environmental ethics cannot be based on theconception of direct duties here discussed, should one draw adistinction between duties towards ourselves, our fellow humanbeings, or animals, and duties regarding plants, or collectiveentities such as populations, species, and ecosystems?     

Adam's place in nature: Respect or domination?

The creation story in Genesis speaks of humankind being given dominion over nature. Does this support the view that nature has solely instrumental value, and is of worth only insofar as it serves the necessities and conveniences of the human species? Does dominion amount to unfettered domination here? An interpretation of the story is advanced employing procedures of practical criticism. Three central images are focussed on: Adam's being given dominion over the other creatures, his naming of them, and his being made in God's likeness. It is argued that these images, in their qualification and enrichment of each other, develop the idea that animals are of worth independently of their usefulness to us. Other key parts of the Bible, that at first may seem to promote unfettered domination, are shown to be more properly read as supporting an animal-benign religious ethics.