Barriers Beyond the Partners: Bureaucratic and Political Constraints to Implementing Joint Forest Management in Tamil Nadu,India

Whereas past research has treated co-management of common pool resources as if villagers and project implementing authorities were the only relevant actors, numerous external factors beyond the control of these two partners create barriers to successful co-management. This paper draws on discussions with Forest Department officials to examine the influence of these forces on the outcomes of Joint Forest Management (JFM) in Tamil Nadu, India. An empirical inquiry into the operational aspects of JFM indicates the important roles of political parties, powerful people, and other state institutions and functionaries as well as the flow of foreign funding. Further, the strong demand by local people for socio-economic development interventions as opposed to improvement of degraded forests belittles the role of the Forest Department relative to other departments. Numerous other conditioning factors and relationships are explored. The authors call for reforms in public governance to allow better participation of all the actors involved for this participatory management approach to succeed and sustain.     

环境分权、市场分割与碳排放

中国有着庞大的环境管理队伍以及巨大的国内市场,科学的环境管理制度以及高度一体化的国内市场将深刻改变碳排放格局,然而,已有研究对于这些影响碳排放的体制性因素既缺乏足够的理论分析也缺乏实证检验。有鉴于此,本文首先分析了环境分权和市场分割影响碳排放的理论机理,并提出了三个理论假设,进一步地,本文以环境管理人员在不同层级政府的配置衡量环境分权度,以相对价格法衡量市场分割程度,基于1995-2012年的省际面板数据,从实证层面检验了环境分权和市场分割对碳排放的影响效应。结果显示:环境分权和市场分割都显著地加剧了碳排放,原因在于分权的环境管理体制安排扭曲了激励,无法对碳排放形成真实有效的约束,而市场分割则恶化了碳排放在区域间的配置效率。同时,环境分权与市场分割对碳排放的共同影响作用上存在互补效应,即环境分权程度越高,市场分割对碳排放的负面影响效应越大,反之,市场分割程度越高,环境分权对碳排放的负面影响效应也越大。这主要是由于环境分权与市场分割是地方政府一对互补的策略行为,在环境分权较高的地区,地方政府进行市场分割的能力越强,而在市场分割较高的地区,地方政府争取环境事务管理权的动力越强。因此,在既定的碳排放约束下,中央政府一方面需要适度集中环境事务管理权限,进一步优化环境事务管理机构设置以及人员队伍在不同层级政府间的配置,提高对碳排放的管控效率,另一方面需要打通省际壁垒,加快区域市场一体化建设,优化碳排放的区域配置,提高碳排放效率。     

Management Decentralization and Montane Forest Conditions in Tanzania

Abstract: We examined how differences in local forest‐management institutions relate to disparate anthropogenic forest disturbance and forest conditions among three neighboring montane forests in Tanzania under centralized, comanaged, or communal management. Institutional differences have been shaped by decentralization reforms. We conducted semistructured interviews with members of forest management committees, local government, and village households and measured anthropogenic disturbance, tree structure, and species composition in forest plots. We assessed differences in governance system components of local institutions, including land tenure, decision‐making autonomy by forest users, and official and de facto processes of rule formation, monitoring, and enforcement among the three management strategies. We also assessed differences in frequencies of prohibited logging and subsistence pole cutting, and measures of forest condition. An adjacent research forest served as an ecological reference for comparison of forest conditions. Governance was similar for comanaged and centralized management, whereas communal managers had greater tenure security and decision‐making autonomy over the use and management of their forest. There was significantly less illegal logging in the communal forest, but subsistence pole cutting was common across all management strategies. The comanaged forest was most disturbed by recent logging and pole cutting, as were peripheral areas of the larger centralized forest. This manifested in more degraded indicators of forest conditions (lower mean tree size, basal area, density of trees ≥ 90 cm dbh, and aboveground biomass and higher overall stem density). Greater tenure security and institutional autonomy of the communal strategy contributed to more effective management, less illegal logging, and maintenance of good forest conditions, but generating livelihood benefits was a challenge for both decentralized strategies. Our results underscore the importance of well‐designed institutional arrangements in forest management and illustrate mechanisms for improved forest governance and conservation in the context of Tanzanian decentralization reforms.     

西藏"一江两河"地区人口空间分布的动态演变

人口分布的空间演变是人口发展过程中在时间和空间上的表现形式,人口的集聚与扩散是诠释区域人口空间分布格局与形态的重要方面.对其研究有助于揭示人口分布现状的本质、理解区域空间结构特征及演变趋势.本研究运用局部空间自相关方法,并结合GIS技术,以县域为基本单元,人口密度为衡量指标,对西藏"一江两河"地区1990-2008年间人口分布空间格局的演变进行了分析.分析结果表明,"一江两河"地区各县市(区)人口总量和密度均有明显增长,人口分布总体上呈现出不断集中的态势.局部自相关分析揭示"一江两河"地区开始显现以拉萨市和日喀则市为中心的两个显著的人口高密度区,显示出该区域人口分布的多中心空间结构特征.对以拉萨市、日喀则市和乃东县为中心的区域密度函数进行拟合.多中心区域密度函数的估计结果显示,"一江两河"地区空间发展正逐步由20世纪90年代单中心(拉萨市城关区)阶段,向目前的多中心向心集聚阶段转变,除拉萨市城关区外,日喀则市和乃东县集聚能力开始显现.     

财政分权对环保投资效率的影响研究——基于DEA-Tobit模型的分析

延续财政分权对环境质量影响的研究,讨论财政分权对环保投资效率的影响.基于中国2004~2014年30个省份的面板数据,在DEA-Tobit模型的研究框架下,测度了各个省份多种类型的环保投资效率,并进一步讨论了财政分权对环保投资效率的影响.实证结果发现,财政分权不利于环保投资效率的改进,特别是不利于建设项目"三同时"环保投资效率、工业污染源治理环保投资效率,以及企业来源环保投资效率的改进.进一步考虑到地区异质性因素,以各地区环保投资额作为门槛变量的分析同样支持上述结论.     

财政分权对环境污染的空间效应

利用2006—2017年我国30个省级行政单位的面板数据,采用空间计量模型对财政分权与环境污染之间的关系进行实证分析,并通过效应分解分别计算出财政收入分权和财政支出分权对环境污染的直接效应、空间溢出效应和总效应。模型估计的结果表明:①财政收入分权与财政支出分权通过直接效应和空间溢出效应两种途径对环境污染产生显著影响,但收入分权与支出分权对环境污染的空间效应具有异质性。②财政收入分权对环境污染具有显著的负向直接效应和负向空间溢出效应,影响系数分别为-5.429和-17.572。提高财政收入分权度不仅有利于减轻本省份环境污染,也对邻近省份的环境污染起到抑制作用。而财政支出分权对环境污染具有显著的负向直接效应和正向的空间溢出效应,影响程度分别为-3.345和1.173。提高财政支出分权虽然有利于减少本省份污染的排放,但在一定程度上引起省际的污染外溢效应,提高邻近省份的污染程度。③从总效应来看,财政收入分权和财政支出分权对环境污染均呈现出显著的负向相关性,影响程度分别为-23.001和-2.172。提高财政分权可降低环境污染水平,有利于环境质量提升。④通过构建不同空间权重矩阵,检验模型的稳健性,结果表明模型估计是稳健可靠的。根据分析结论,可能的启示与建议有:①合理划分中央政府和地方政府之间的财政事权和支出责任,在提高财政支出分权度的同时提高地方政府财政收入分权度,充分发挥地方政府环境治理的积极性和主动性。②继续加大生态环境保护力度,完善绿色经济考核机制,引导地方政府加大对污染治理和环境改善的支出水平及效率。     

Property rights integrity,tenure security and forestland rental market participation: Evidence from Jiangxi Province,China

The decentralization of property rights is the focus of the forest tenure reforms in several developing countries. In China, it was achieved by the launch of a new round of collective forest tenure reform beginning in 2003, which provided farmers with more integrated and secure forestland rights. Drawing on household data collected in Jiangxi province in 2011 and 2013, this paper examines the impacts of households’ recognition of property rights and improved tenure security on forestland rental activities. Our empirical results show that households with higher perceptions of more complete use rights and mortgage rights have a lower probability and intensity of renting‐in land, while households with lower expectations of future forestland redistribution or expropriation are more likely to rent in forestland and more of it. These results imply that the development of a forestland rental market leading to better forest management requires an integrated forestland management approach consisting of decentralization of property rights and village governance. In particular, the central government may further clarify the rights and obligations affiliated to forestland ownership, contractual rights, and management rights; while the village collective may shift from direct intervention in the integrity and security of forestland rights to the supervision and protection of decentralized forestland rights to increase efficiency from the decentralization of property rights.     

产业集聚向心力和扩散离心力的变化过程——以改革开放以来苏锡常地区制造业聚散为例

整合新经济地理学、现代经济地理学强调的地方化因素，构建了一个包含初始因素、增强因素和扩散因素在内的非均质空间产业集聚的分析框架，采用历史归纳分析方法，深入剖析了影响苏锡常地区制造业集聚、扩散的向心力和离心力及其变化过程。认为，自然条件和地理区位优势、历史积累的地方化因素、接近外部市场是苏锡常地区产业集聚初始向心力；地方政府的作用、集群和网络效应成为外资快速集聚的增强因素；环境污染和生态环境的恶化、要素价格上涨、区域开发重点转移导致向心力和离心力的微妙变化，导致近年来苏锡常地区部分产业呈现扩散趋势，并使得苏锡常地区制造业步入产业升级重要阶段     

基于央地分权视角的环境规制策略演化博弈分析

当前,我国环境的根本问题是由粗放式的经济发展模式所引起的,而这一发展模式的根源在于"中国式央地分权"下的政府行为。这种具有中国特色的分权模式的独特之处在于中央政府对地方经济放权的同时,仍然保持政治上的集权控制,上级政府根据绩效考核提拔地方官员,即"经济分权、政治集权"特性。中国式分权下,我国的环境治理体制依据行政区域的划分来设置管理权限,按照政府层级的构成进行垂直式领导,即中央政府统一制定环境政策,地方政府负责各辖区内环境政策的执行。在全国范围内,央地两级政府的关系表现为动态的重复博弈。针对我国现行环境规制执行策略,借助演化经济学研究工具,基于央地分权的视角,将地方政府与中央政府两大主体同时纳入分析框架。根据复制动态方程探讨参与主体的行为演化特征和行为演化稳定策略,在模型求解的基础上,利用MATLAB仿真工具,分析不同情形下参与主体演化稳定策略的走向及其收敛趋势。研究发现,央地两级政府在环境规制策略执行过程中的动态演化,很大程度上取决于地方政府环境规制执行力度、成本、收益和损失以及中央政府监管力度、成本和处罚力度等因素的大小。因此,针对地方政府环境策略激励设计,应重点改革政绩考核机制,引入市场机制,并通过环保补贴、财政转移支付等手段降低地方政府环境规制执行成本;中央政府应通过调节政绩考核体系中的经济发展指标和环境指标的权重系数来加强对地方政府环境规制执行情况的监管力度,建立第三方监管机制以降低中央政府监管成本,制定合理的奖惩机制以提高监管效率;以期推动我国环境规制策略的高效执行,促进环境绩效向经济绩效的良性转换,实现双重帕累托改进。     

Balancing local interests and national conservation obligations in nature protection. The case of local management boards in Norway

In 2010, Norway introduced local management of national parks and other large protected areas. Boards comprised of local politicians are delegated extended powers in the management of the protected areas. This paper examines how this system of local management deals with the conflicting dimensions of local interests versus national obligations, and conservation versus use. The study is based on data from surveys to protected area board members and other actors involved, and on case studies in two protected areas. The main finding is that the boards, accountable to central government but comprised of politicians accountable to the local voters, aim to balance local interests and national obligations, and conservation and use. Popular involvement and anchorage is, however, weak due to lack of mobilization and transparency. Furthermore, formal restrictions hindering the boards from dealing with local economic development could make the boards less attractive for the local political leadership.