Cooperative Game Among Cities in Urban Agglomerations and Economical Sustainable Development

This paper analyses redounded profits of cooperation and non-cooperation among cities in urban agglomerations based on game theory. It discusses the problems of economical development among cities with feeble cooperation, and deduces the conclusion that only cooperation of cities produces the maximum profits and realizes Pareto efficiency for cities and urban agglomerations. The paper states that cooperation is the cornerstone of economic sustainable development in urban agglomerations in profits produced by cooperation among cities. Some suggestions to accelerate cooperation among cities are proposed.     

环境保护的国际立法发展

"和平与"发展"、"环境保护"都被列为当今的世界主题正因如此,环境保护的国际立法也尤显重要.     

Strategic investment in reputation

Although collective efforts are common in both animal and human societies, many human and probably animal social dilemmas have no obvious cooperative solution, which is a challenge for evolutionary biologists. In public goods games, i.e. the experimental paradigm for studying the sustainability of a public resource with human subjects, initial cooperation usually declines quickly. Recently, it has been shown that the interaction with another social game in which good reputation attracts help, can maintain a high level of cooperation in the public goods game. Here we show experimentally that humans use different strategies in the public goods game conditional on whether the player knows that his decisions will be either known or unknown in another social game. The knowledge of being recognized as the same individual in both scenarios motivates players to invest in their reputation and thus sustain the public resource. However, cooperation declines immediately when individual identities switch from being recognizable to being unrecognizable between the two interacting games.Communicated by M. Borgerhoff-Mulder     

On the sustainability of common property resources

We provide a model where a common property resource is managed by two types of agents, cooperators and non-cooperators, who adjust their extraction strategies in response to persistent differential payoffs. In our model, the social approval of cooperators works as a reward mechanism which, as we show, favors both the pervasiveness of cooperative behavior and the sustainable management of natural resources. Specifically, we show that in the presence of such a reward mechanism a stable equilibrium can be reached with both strategies being practiced simultaneously and a decentralized and sustainable management of common property resources is possible.     

Vibrational signals in a gregarious sawfly larva (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Perga affinis</Emphasis>): group coordination or competitive signaling?

Group living confers both benefits and costs to the individuals involved. Benefits may include enhanced defense, thermoregulation, and increased foraging efficiency while costs often involve competition for resources such as food, shelter, and mates. Communication provides a medium of exchange among individuals engaged in either cooperative or competitive interactions. The functional analysis of signals within groups therefore requires testing both cooperative and competitive functions, although the latter is infrequently done. In this paper, I study the use of two vibrational signals in a gregarious, processionary Australian sawfly larva, Perga affinis: tapping and contractions. Tapping involves striking the substrate with the sclerotized portion of the abdominal tail and a contraction is a fast, whole-body twitch, which is both tactile and vibrational in its transmission. For tapping, I first demonstrate that it is a form of communication, as tapping of one larva elicits tapping in another, and that it is transmitted through substrate vibrations. I then test whether the signal is mostly cooperative or competitive in nature by examining it in light of two hypotheses: (1) the Group Coordination hypothesis, stating that the signal functions to maintain group cohesiveness and (2) the Competitive Signaling hypothesis, stating that tapping serves as a competitive assessment signal between larvae while feeding. For contractions, I test only the group coordination hypothesis that they serve to coordinate and initiate group movement. Results support the group coordination hypothesis for each signal. While feeding, lone larvae (without potential competitors) were significantly more likely to tap than those in groups, and this trend continued in non-feeding situations. Contractions regularly preceded periods of group movement during processions and were given with increasing frequency before departure from preforaging clusters. The vibrational signals in this processionary species likely function cooperatively to maintain group cohesiveness and coordinate movement.     

Low dose effects and non-monotonic dose responses for endocrine active chemicals: Science to practice workshop: Workshop summary

A workshop was held in Berlin September 12–14th 2012 to assess the state of the science of the data supporting low dose effects and non-monotonic dose responses (“low dose hypothesis”) for chemicals with endocrine activity (endocrine disrupting chemicals or EDCs). This workshop consisted of lectures to present the current state of the science of EDC action and also the risk assessment process. These lectures were followed by breakout sessions to integrate scientists from various backgrounds to discuss in an open and unbiased manner the data supporting the “low dose hypothesis”. While no consensus was reached the robust discussions were helpful to inform both basic scientists and risk assessors on all the issues. There were a number of important ideas developed to help continue the discussion and improve communication over the next few years.     

Public commitment making as a structural solution in social dilemmas

Research shows that public commitment making helps promote pro-environmental behavior. However, not everyone may be willing to make such commitments. Therefore, it is important to investigate the conditions under which commitment making is likely to occur. We expected dispositional trust and situational expectations to determine the willingness to install a system of public commitments. Two studies are presented which show that group members low in dispositional trust (low trusters) are likely to choose for a public commitment system when their situational expectations concerning other group members' contributions are high, while those high in dispositional trust (high trusters) are likely to choose for a public commitment system when their situational expectations concerning other group members' contributions are low. It appears that for both low and high trusters the choice for a system of public commitments is instigated by a motivation to further the collective outcomes.     

Cross-Boundary Coordination on Forested Landscapes: Investigating Alternatives for Implementation

Cross-boundary coordination is a tool for ecosystem management whereby landowners voluntarily coordinate management practices toward economic and/or ecological landscape-scale outcomes (e.g., fiber, invasive species control, habitat). Past research indicates that it may be particularly applicable on landscapes that include small forest landholdings. To explore alternatives by which coordination might occur, we conducted seven focus groups with landowners (n = 51) who actively manage their forests in southwest Wisconsin and northeast Iowa. Focus group participants were presented with three hypothetical alternatives to coordinate with their neighbors; landowners could self-organize, work with a natural resource professional (i.e., forester), or work with an organization to complete a cross-boundary practice. In this article, we focus on the latter two alternatives and the role of two social theories—principal-agent and cooperation—in explaining landowners’ evaluations of these alternatives. Key findings are that (1) cross-boundary coordination has the potential to alleviate problems between landowners and resource professionals inherent to their typical working relationship, and (2) social relationships are a major factor contributing to landowners’ willingness to participate. We posit that cross-boundary coordination offers a non-economic incentive for landowners to work together as it may reduce the uncertainty associated with hiring a resource professional. At the same time, professionals can provide a bridging function among landowners who are unacquainted. To achieve these outcomes and expand the adoption of cross-boundary coordination, we suggest four guidelines. First, foster dialogue among landowners toward shared cognition and oversight. Second, match landowners’ practices and objectives such that there are clear benefits to all. Third, develop relationships through low risk activities where possible. Fourth, do not expect on-going commitments.

The influence of social experience on cooperative behaviour of rats (Rattus norvegicus): direct vs generalised reciprocity

Cooperation among non-kin has been attributed sometimes to reciprocal altruism: Two or more individuals exchange behaviour that benefits the respective partner. According to direct reciprocity, cooperation is based on past behaviour of a known partner. In contrast, in generalised reciprocity, cooperation is based on anonymous social experience where the identity of the partner is irrelevant. In a previous study, female Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus) were found to cooperate according to a generalised reciprocity mechanism. In this study, we tested whether Norway rats would also cooperate as predicted by a direct reciprocity mechanism and whether direct reciprocity would cause a higher propensity to cooperate than generalised reciprocity. Focal animals were experimentally manipulated to receive social experience from known or unknown, helpful or defecting partners in an instrumental cooperative task. Our first experiment shows that rats are more helpful towards a partner from which they had received help before than towards a partner that had not helped (i.e. direct reciprocity). Our second experiment revealed that after receiving help by others, rats were more helpful towards a partner from which they had received help before than towards a new partner (i.e. direct reciprocity generated a higher cooperation propensity than generalised reciprocity). We conclude that in female Norway rats, the tendency to cooperate is influenced by partner-specific information. To our knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate direct reciprocity in rodents, and it is the first study testing direct vs generalised reciprocity in animals.     

Pedestrian behavior and exit selection in evacuation of a corridor - An experimental study

In this paper, we present an experiment whose purpose was to study evacuees’ exit selection under different behavioral objectives. The experiment was conducted in a corridor with two exits located asymmetrically. This geometry was used to make most participants face a nontrivial decision on which exit to use. We analyze the behavior on a macroscopic level using statistical methods. Our results suggest that the members of an evacuating crowd may not be able to make optimal decisions when assessing the fastest exit to evacuate. In addition, the egress time of the whole crowd turns out to be shorter when the evacuees behave egoistically instead of behaving cooperatively. This is an interesting result because many studies on real emergencies show that evacuees tend to cooperate and act altruistically.