Optimal foraging: The influence of intraspecific competition on diet selection

Summary Three-spined sticklebacks (Gasterosteus aculeatus) showed a relative preference for a familiar prey size when hunting for two sizes of Daphnia magna in high density. This result is not compatible with the apparent size hypothesis. Ten groups were investigated, each consisting of two stickle-backs tested under three consecutive experimental conditions, to establish whether the function of the preference for a familiar prey size could be avoidance of competition.First, the relative competitive ability of each fish was determined by the proportion it consumed of three series of 60 medium-sized daphnia, offered pairwise. Second, during the consumption of five series of 30 pairs, each consisting of a large and a small daphnia, it was determined how many items each fish caught of each prey size. As handling times were equal for both prey types, the larger prey size was more profitable. There was a significant correlation between relative competitive ability and mean proportion of large daphnia in the diet. In the last series the less successful competitiors caught a higher proportion of small prey than in the first series. Finally, each fish was given the choice between large and small daphnia in the absence of its competitor. The sticklebacks chose a diet similar to the one they had been allowed to select previously with competition. The previously more successful competitors concentrated on large daphnia, whereas the poorer competitors fed as generalists but not unselectively.The fish probably learned the distance from which they had recently attacked familiar prey successfully. This sure attack distance depends on the fish's competitive ability.     

Strategic investment in reputation

Although collective efforts are common in both animal and human societies, many human and probably animal social dilemmas have no obvious cooperative solution, which is a challenge for evolutionary biologists. In public goods games, i.e. the experimental paradigm for studying the sustainability of a public resource with human subjects, initial cooperation usually declines quickly. Recently, it has been shown that the interaction with another social game in which good reputation attracts help, can maintain a high level of cooperation in the public goods game. Here we show experimentally that humans use different strategies in the public goods game conditional on whether the player knows that his decisions will be either known or unknown in another social game. The knowledge of being recognized as the same individual in both scenarios motivates players to invest in their reputation and thus sustain the public resource. However, cooperation declines immediately when individual identities switch from being recognizable to being unrecognizable between the two interacting games.Communicated by M. Borgerhoff-Mulder     

Sequential female choice and the previous male effect in sticklebacks

Summary Female choice, identified as a major force in sexual selection theory, has recently been demonstrated in a number of species. These tests concentrated on simultaneous choice situations although females have to compare males sequentially in most territorial species, which is the more demanding task. Here it is shown that female three-spined sticklebacks, Gasterosteus aculeatus L., rate sequentially presented males according to their brightness. With increasing costs of sampling the females become less choosy. Furthermore, a male's attractiveness has a significant effect on the female's rating of the next male; a given male is rated higher when preceded by a duller male than by a brighter one and vice versa. Female sticklebacks use a stochastic decision rule in sequential mate choice that is attuned to the attractiveness of the present and previously encountered male. This demonstration of a previous male effect not only indicates an efficient mechanism for finding the best of a number of males but also extends the applicability of sexual selection theory.Offprint requests to: T.C.M. Bakker     

Threat-sensitive feeding strategy of immature sticklebacks (Gasterosteus aculeatus) in response to recent experimental infection with the cestode Schistocephalus solidus

Threat-sensitive decision-making might be changed in response to a parasitic infection that impairs future reproduction. Infected animals should take more risk to gain energy to speed up their growth to achieve early reproduction and/or to strengthen their immune response. To avoid correlational evidence, we experimentally infected and sham-infected randomly selected immature three-spined sticklebacks with the cestode Schistocephalus solidus. For 7 weeks we determined the threat-sensitive foraging decisions and growth of individual sticklebacks in the presence of a live pike (Esox lucius). The experimenters were blind with respect to the infection status of the fish. In contrast to previous studies, our recently infected fish should have been almost unconstrained by the parasite and thus have been able to adopt an appropriate life history strategy. We found a strong predator effect for both infected and uninfected fish: the sticklebacks’ risk-sensitive foraging strategy resulted in significantly reduced growth under predation risk. Infected fish did not grow significantly faster under predation risk than uninfected fish. Since infected fish consumed much less prey in the presence of the predator than did infected fish in its absence, they obviously did not use the opportunity to maximize their growth rate to reach reproduction before the parasite impairs it. Received: 21 June 1999 / Revised: 27 November 1999 / Accepted: 5 September 2000     

Female sticklebacks Gasterosteus aculeatus use self-reference to optimize MHC allele number during mate selection

Theoretical and empirical studies suggest that an optimal resistance to pathogens and parasites requires an optimal number of MHC alleles per individual. Here we argue that three-spined sticklebacks (Gasterosteus aculeatus) achieve this goal by applying a strategy that involves a self-referential process. According to this model, females complement their own set of alleles with a more or less diverse set of male alleles such that the combined diversity reaches an optimum. In previous experiments, we have identified allele counting as a major mate-choice strategy in large populations. The self-referential allele-counting hypothesis predicts that MHC-based mate choice favors dissimilar MHC alleles in small populations facing the risk of inbreeding. Therefore, we conducted an experiment that simulated a small effective population size with low MHC class-II diversity. Our experiments are based on the analysis of MHC class-IIB alleles that explain a major part of the overall MHC diversity in sticklebacks, as determined by mathematical modeling. The results show that females preferred males with dissimilar alleles. Our present and the previous studies (which we reanalyzed with respect to our new predictions) show that irrespective of high or low population diversity faced by female sticklebacks for their mate choice, they use information about their own and their potential mate's MHC polymorphism for optimal complementation of their own set of alleles. From combining the data of the previous and the present experiment we found that female sticklebacks try to achieve an optimum number of MHC class-IIB alleles for their offspring through mate choice. The chosen MHC diversity is close to the most frequent diversity found naturally in individual fish, which in addition have the lowest parasite burden.     

Parasites determine a predator's optimal feeding strategy

Summary The diet selected by three-spined sticklebacks (Gasterosteus aculeatus) depends on the degree of parasitization by one or both of two parasite species (Schistocephalus solidus, Glugea anomala). Uninfested fish prefer the more profitable of two different size classes of prey (Daphinia magna). Fish parasitized by Glugea or Schistocephalus attack both prey types equally often, whereas sticklebacks infested by both parasite species prefer to attack the less profitable prey. The diet selected is optimal under the condition that parasites decrease their host's competitive ability.     

Do sticklebacks cooperate repeatedly in reciprocal pairs?

Summary In a shoal of four sticklebacks (Gasterosteus aculeatus) individual fish had partners with whom they repeatedly performed pairwise predator inspection visits. In six different trials, we found two reciprocal pairs per trial significantly more often than would be expected by chance. These results provide further evidence for a TIT FOR TAT like cooperation strategy in sticklebacks. Offprint requests to: M. Milinski     

Reputation is valuable within and outside one’s own social group

To find conditions under which humans cooperate within groups of unrelated individuals has been of major interest in the behavioral sciences. The experimental paradigm for studying potential cooperation in social dilemmas is the public goods game. Here humans regularly fail to sustain a public resource cooperatively. However, the need to maintain good reputation for other social interactions, such as indirect reciprocity, has been identified as an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation in public goods situations. As a side effect of building a good reputation through cooperative actions, an individual provides direct benefits to members of his/her own social group. These benefits could be an incentive to reward a good reputation of group members. Here we show experimentally that building a good reputation through cooperative behavior in a public goods situation is rewarded in future social interactions, not only within ones own social group but also, at a similar level, in other social groups: humans regard cooperative behavior of others as an honest signal irrespective of past direct personal benefits. Reputation gained within as well as outside ones own social group can be a driving force for selfish individuals to cooperate in public goods situations, and thereby sustain any public resource.Communicated by T. Czeschlik