Environmental Science and Pollution Research - Fetal growth has been demonstrated to be an important predictor of perinatal and postnatal health. Although the effects of maternal exposure to air... 相似文献
The optimal allocation of sediment resources needs to balance three objectives including ecological, economic, and social benefits so as to realize sustainable development of sediment resources. This study aims to apply fuzzy programming and bargaining approaches to solve the problem of optimal allocation of sediment resources. Firstly, Pareto-optimal solutions of multi-objective optimization were introduced, and the multi-objective optimal allocation model of sediment resources and fuzzy programming model was constructed. Then, from the perspective of multiplayer cooperation, the optimal allocation model of sediment resources was transformed into a game model by using Nash bargaining, and Nash bargaining solution was obtained as the optimal equilibrium strategy. Finally, the influence of different disagreement utility points and bargaining weights on the results was discussed, and the results of Nash bargaining and fuzzy programming methods were compared and analyzed. Results corroborate that Nash bargaining can achieve the cooperative optimization of multiple objectives with competitive relationship and obtain satisfactory scheme. Disagreement utility points and bargaining weights have a certain impact on the optimization results. The solution of fuzzy programming is close to that of Nash bargaining, which provides different ideas for multi-objective optimization problem.
The only joint effort area of provincial and municipal governments resides in Guangdong Province and Shenzhen City in China’s carbon emission trading system (ETS) pilots, which characterize the national carbon ETS plots. The present study on the operating experience from this area has important reference value for the national carbon ETS. Analysis and comparison of the key elements show many differences in coverage, total allowance, allowance allocation, and MRV mechanism between Guangdong and Shenzhen carbon ETS. The present study provides the following explanation: (1) the design characteristics of carbon ETS (e.g. coverage, total quotas, the allocation, and MRV mechanism) depend on the local geographical conditions and policy goals. The differences of economic structure in Guangdong Province and Shenzhen City result in different coverage, which then result in differences in other management elements. (2) The operating state of the carbon market is affected by overall design of carbon ETS: in the case of tighter total allowance, lower proportion of China Certified Emission Reductions, and harsher punishment, the carbon market is relatively active, which intends to produce carbon financial market. Based on deep analysis of operation characteristics of carbon ETS in Guangdong and Shenzhen, the present study suggests that (1) the allowance should be allocated freely at the beginning stage and then gradually transited to the voluntary paid auction; (2) the allowances assigned to companies shall be linked up with their energy-saving objectives; (3) the output fluctuations and economic influence on the allowance allocation should be properly handled to maintain the fairness and consistence of allowance allocation standards; (4) stable public expectation is one of the key elements to maintain the regular operation of carbon ETS; (5) constrained carbon emission behavior outside ETS can contribute to social justice; and (6) the improvement of professional skills of relevant personnel in the enterprise and independent third party can enhance carbon emissions data reliability. 相似文献