Strategic climate policy with offsets and incomplete abatement: Carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade

This paper provides a first analysis of a “policy bloc” of fossil fuel importers which implements an optimal climate policy, faces a (non-policy) fringe of other fuel importers, and an exporter bloc, and purchases offset from the fringe. We compare a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade scheme for the policy bloc, in either case accompanied by an efficient offset mechanism for reducing emissions in the fringe. The policy bloc is shown to prefer a tax over a cap, since only a tax reduces the fuel export price and by more when the policy bloc is larger. Offsets are also more favorable to the policy bloc under a tax than under a cap. The optimal offset price under a carbon tax is below the tax rate, while under a cap and free quota trading the offset price must equal the quota price. The domestic carbon and offset prices are both higher under a tax than under a cap when the policy bloc is small. When the policy bloc is larger, the offset price can be higher under a cap. Fringe countries gain by mitigation in the policy bloc, more under a carbon tax since the fuel import price is lower.     

Carbon taxation,OPEC and the end of oil

I develop a differential game between an oil cartel and an importer investing in research and development (R&D) to reduce the cost of a green substitute to oil. In equilibrium, the cartel is forced to deter the substitute, which thus imposes a price ceiling falling over time. Credible carbon taxes are below the Pigovian level, implying the importer cannot internalise the full pollution externality, much less capture resource rents. Without carbon pricing, the importer curtails long-run pollution using a costly R&D programme. Normatively, climate policy will be more expensive if relying on green R&D programmes only.     

Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering: Clash or cooperation?

Solar geoengineering has received increasing attention as an option to temporarily stabilize global temperatures. A key concern is that heterogeneous preferences over the optimal amount of cooling combined with low deployment costs may allow the country with the strongest incentive for cooling, the so-called free-driver, to impose a substantial externality on the rest of the world. We analyze whether the threat of counter-geoengineering technologies capable of negating the climatic effects of solar geoengineering can overcome the free-driver problem and tilt the game in favour of international cooperation. Our game-theoretical model of countries with asymmetric preferences allows for a rigorous analysis of the strategic interaction surrounding solar geoengineering and counter-geoengineering. We find that counter-geoengineering prevents the free-driver outcome, but not always with benign effects. The presence of counter-geoengineering leads to either a climate clash where countries engage in a non-cooperative escalation of opposing climate interventions (negative welfare effect), a moratorium treaty where countries commit to abstain from either type of climate intervention (indeterminate welfare effect), or cooperative deployment of solar geoengineering (positive welfare effect). We show that the outcome depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry in temperature preferences between countries.     

Salience of carbon taxes in the gasoline market

We demonstrate that the carbon tax imposed by the Canadian province of British Columbia caused a decline in short-run gasoline demand that is significantly greater than would be expected from an equivalent increase in the market price of gasoline. That the carbon tax is more salient, or yields a larger change in demand than equivalent market price movements, is robust to a range of specifications. As a result of the large consumer response to the tax, we calculate that during its first four years, the tax reduced carbon dioxide emissions from gasoline consumption by 2.4 million tonnes.     

Carbon abatement in the fuel market with biofuels: Implications for second best policies

A carbon tax on fuel would penalize carbon intensive fuels like gasoline and shift fuel consumption to less carbon intensive alternatives like biofuels. Since biofuel production competes for land with agricultural production, a carbon tax could increase land rents and raise food prices. This paper analyzes the welfare effect of a carbon tax on fuel consisting of gasoline and biofuel in the presence of a labor tax, with and without a biofuel subsidy. The market impacts of a carbon tax are also compared with that of a subsidy. Findings show that if a carbon tax increases biofuel demand, the tax interaction effect due to higher fuel prices is exacerbated by higher land rent and food prices and greater erosion of the carbon tax base. Thus, the second best optimal carbon tax for fuel is lower with biofuel in the fuel mix, especially if biofuel is subsidized.     

Biofuel Plantations on Forested Lands: Double Jeopardy for Biodiversity and Climate

Abstract: The growing demand for biofuels is promoting the expansion of a number of agricultural commodities, including oil palm (Elaeis guineensis). Oil‐palm plantations cover over 13 million ha, primarily in Southeast Asia, where they have directly or indirectly replaced tropical rainforest. We explored the impact of the spread of oil‐palm plantations on greenhouse gas emission and biodiversity. We assessed changes in carbon stocks with changing land use and compared this with the amount of fossil‐fuel carbon emission avoided through its replacement by biofuel carbon. We estimated it would take between 75 and 93 years for the carbon emissions saved through use of biofuel to compensate for the carbon lost through forest conversion, depending on how the forest was cleared. If the original habitat was peatland, carbon balance would take more than 600 years. Conversely, planting oil palms on degraded grassland would lead to a net removal of carbon within 10 years. These estimates have associated uncertainty, but their magnitude and relative proportions seem credible. We carried out a meta‐analysis of published faunal studies that compared forest with oil palm. We found that plantations supported species‐poor communities containing few forest species. Because no published data on flora were available, we present results from our sampling of plants in oil palm and forest plots in Indonesia. Although the species richness of pteridophytes was higher in plantations, they held few forest species. Trees, lianas, epiphytic orchids, and indigenous palms were wholly absent from oil‐palm plantations. The majority of individual plants and animals in oil‐palm plantations belonged to a small number of generalist species of low conservation concern. As countries strive to meet obligations to reduce carbon emissions under one international agreement (Kyoto Protocol), they may not only fail to meet their obligations under another (Convention on Biological Diversity) but may actually hasten global climate change. Reducing deforestation is likely to represent a more effective climate‐change mitigation strategy than converting forest for biofuel production, and it may help nations meet their international commitments to reduce biodiversity loss.     

Sellers' Hedging Incentives at EPA's Emission Trading Auction

Cason (1993, J. Environ. Econom. Management25, 177–195, doi:10.1006/jeem 1993.1041) argued that the auction which the EPA used in order to start the market for sulfur allowances may reduce the efficiency of the market since it gives sellers an incentive to understate their valuation. In this paper we show that the sellers' incentives are even more perverse than Cason suggested when we take into account that sellers can also submit a bid. We show that sellers have an incentive to set their asking price equal to 0 while simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a positive bid.     

Incomplete International Cooperation to Reduce CO2 Emissions: The Case of Price Discrimination

This paper analyzes the effect of introducing a fuel tax in some countries, but not all, when the world fuel market is monopolistic. Based on the observation that price discrimination becomes possible in these circumstances, it is shown that the fuel price in countries not levying the tax may increase, in contrast to common views.     

Development of a low-carbon economy in China

Under the pressures of climate change, many countries are trying to adapt to a low-carbon economy. In this paper, we review the development pattern of the low-carbon economy of major countries and its impact on the world economy. We then argue that economic development and abatement of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in China should be balanced. The challenges that China faces should also be considered carefully. It is necessary for China to find an approach to solve the issues of climate change, which should include new technologies and establishing incentive mechanisms and reform-oriented policies. These guidelines can adjust the structure of the economy and energy use, improve energy efficiency, promote the development of alternative and renewable energy, enhance the potential of carbon sinks, and develop advanced technology to perfect a 'Clean Development Mechanism' and sustainable development through international cooperation.     

Tax evasion and optimal environmental taxes

This paper introduces a new argument to the debate about the role of environmental taxes in modern tax systems. Some environmental taxes, particularly taxes on gasoline or electricity, are more difficult to evade than taxes on labor or income. When the tax base is shifted in a revenue-neutral manner toward these environmental taxes, the result is a net reduction in the amount of tax evasion. Using a carbon tax as a motivating example, the “tax evasion effect” is shown to sharply reduce the welfare cost of controlling emissions. A simple computable general equilibrium model suggests that the impact of considering tax evasion can be large: costs are lowered by 28% in the United States, by 89% in China, and by 97% in India. In countries with high levels of pre-existing tax evasion, a carbon tax will pay for itself through improvements in the efficiency of the tax system.     

Inclusive development,oil extraction and climate change: a multilevel analysis of Kenya

There has been considerable research on North–South issues on climate change; however, little work has been done on how the recent discovery of oil in some developing countries could affect North–South relations, the prospects for development for the South, climate change and local socio-environmental issues. Using the theory of inclusive development, the concept of the Right to Development, and their relation to stranded assets, this paper addresses the question: what does inclusive development imply at the national and global level in dealing with oil extraction in the context of climate change? Based on a literature review and a layered case study of Kenya, this paper concludes that (a) Kenyans argue that Kenya has a right to extract and use oil resources and that rich countries should reduce their extraction and use; (b) such a claim could be integrated in an appropriate emissions trading scheme; and that (c) Kenya should also account for the national and local socioecological aspects to reduce potential local conflict, yet the conditions favoring inclusive development are not yet established. However, such an argument may also lead to perverse results. If addressing climate change requires phasing out fossil fuels, this argument may lead to stranded assets in both developed and developing countries, and may ironically leave developing countries poorer off as stranded assets are possibly more expensive than having stranded resources.     

Non-cooperative and cooperative climate policies with anticipated breakthrough technology

Global warming can be curbed by pricing carbon emissions and thus substituting fossil fuel with renewable energy consumption. Breakthrough technologies (e.g., fusion energy) can reduce the cost of such policies. However, the chance of such a technology coming to market depends on investment. We model breakthroughs as an irreversible tipping point in a multi-country world, with different degrees of international cooperation. We show that international spill-over effects of R&D in carbon-free technologies lead to double free-riding, strategic over-pollution and underinvestment in green R&D, thus making climate change mitigation more difficult. We also show how the demand structure determines whether carbon pricing and R&D policies are substitutes or complements.     

Optimal policy instruments for externality-producing durable goods under present bias

When consumers exhibit present bias, the standard solution to market failures caused by externalities—Pigouvian pricing—is suboptimal. I investigate policies aimed at externalities for present-biased consumers. Optimal policy includes an instrument to correct the externality and an instrument to correct the present bias. Either instrument can be an incentive-based policy (e.g. a tax on fuel economy) or a command-and-control policy (e.g. a fuel economy mandate). Under consumer heterogeneity, a command-and-control policy may dominate an incentive-based policy. Calibrated to the US automobile market, simulation results suggest that the second-best gasoline tax is 3–30% higher than marginal external damages. The optimal price policy includes a gasoline tax set about equal to marginal external damages and a fuel economy tax that increases the price of an average non-hybrid car by about $550–$2200 relative to the price of an average hybrid car.     

Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

Sustainability and the measurement of future paths in genuine savings: case studies

This paper extrapolates future paths of genuine savings (GS) by using our integrated assessment model. The results with the base case (BC) indicate that both GS without population change (GS) and GS with population change (GSn) are almost positive in OECD countries in the twenty-first century (satisfying the necessary but insufficient condition for sustainability); those numbers are projected to be negative in 2100. Asia (ASIA), the Middle East and Africa (MEAF), the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (FSEE), and the world show upward trends for both values, showing negative signs in 2010 and positive signs after 2050 (in ASIA, MEAF, and the world) and in 2100 (in FSEE). The values in Latin America (LAMR) remain negative throughout. We examine additional following three cases: demand reduction (DR), carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions reduction (CR), and population reduction (PR). The GSn results compared to the BC indicate that (1) GSn in DR is similar to that of BC, (2) GSn in PR is slightly higher than that of BC, and (3) GSn in CR is unexpectedly lower than that of BC. This GSn reduction in the CR case derives from the fact that the term for calculating resource depletion (especially resource rent, which equals the difference between price and cost) in GS and GSn increased, leading to a greater term being subtracted from gross savings. The resource price increases with the marginal price of natural gas, given the energy-source shift in reducing CO₂ emissions, from cheap coal to expensive natural gas.     

Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

Cumulative carbon emissions and economic policy: In search of general principles

We exploit recent advances in climate science to develop a physically consistent, yet surprisingly simple, model of climate policy. It seems that key economic models have greatly overestimated the delay between carbon emissions and warming, and ignored the saturation of carbon sinks that takes place when the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide rises. This has important implications for climate policy. If carbon emissions are abated, damages are avoided almost immediately. Therefore it is optimal to reduce emissions significantly in the near term and bring about a slow transition to optimal peak warming, even if optimal steady-state/peak warming is high. The optimal carbon price should start relatively high and grow relatively fast.     

Political influence on non-cooperative international climate policy

We analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether to link their domestic emission permit markets to an international market, which only forms if it is supported by all countries. In the second stage, countries non-cooperatively decide on the number of tradable emission allowances. In both stages, special interest groups try to sway the government in their favor. We find that (i) both the choice of regime and the levels of domestic and global emissions only depend on the aggregate levels of organized stakes in all countries and not on their distribution among individual interest groups and (ii) an increase in lobbying influence by a particular lobby group may backfire by inducing a change towards the lobby group's less preferred regime.     

Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab

Tax-aversion reduces the likelihood that price rationing can be a politically viable tool for environmental protection. We examine the case of the classic Pigouvian tax to control a negative externality, and consider how recycling the revenues, labeling of the tax and information about its purpose affects the support for taxation. We test the support for taxation within a single-price market experiment, in which purchases by some buyers impose external costs on others. Observing behavior consistent with tax-aversion, we also find that recycling the revenues to more narrowly targeted groups seems to increase support for taxation. In the absence of narrow revenue recycling, labeling a Pigouvian instrument as a ‘tax’ may significantly lower the likelihood of voter support.     

Market equilibrium and welfare effects of a fuel tax in China: The impact of consumers' response through driving patterns

We investigate the market equilibrium and welfare effects of a fuel tax in China relative to an alternative policy instrument that rations the number of new automobile sales through auctioned quotas. Unlike those of previous studies, our modeling approach incorporates both household car purchase and utilization decisions, the latter of which have been ignored in previous studies on China's fuel tax. Ignoring this margin of choice will underestimate the fuel tax's ability to mitigate externalities. Using detailed household-level panel data and a fixed effects econometric specification, we estimate the fuel price elasticity of vehicle miles traveled is −0.59 on average. The results of the counterfactual analysis suggest that a 51% increase in tax-inclusive gasoline prices will reduce car sales by 24.9% but increase social welfare to a degree that depends on vehicles' lifetime. We find that compared to auctioned quotas, the fuel tax results in greater car sales but higher social welfare.