工业水环境监管契约研究

对工业污水排放的有效监管是水环境保护的重要环节。分析了我国目前监管主体所处的困境，考虑中央监察与公众参与的监督约束作用，构建了水环境监管体系。并设计出具有激励约束惩罚效力的水环境监管契约，建立委托 代理模型，通过求解得出监管契约中污水排放标准、监管频率、补偿额度以及罚款数额的最优值。在此基础上，以太湖流域两个成本类型差异较大的印染企业为例，定量设计两级水环境监管契约，分析公众参与程度和地方政府庇护企业程度对契约取值的影响。结果表明：提高公众参与程度可以有效降低罚款额度，削减政企矛盾；当公众参与程度和惩罚额度一定时，通过环境问责等制度降低地方政府庇护企业的程度，能够减小监管频率，从而削减监管执行成本     

基于GIS和组合赋权法的农村生态功能适宜性评价及管制分区

在村级土地利用规划过程中进行生态功能适宜性评价，以了解农村生态质量状况、明确农村生态功能适宜程度及空间分布，为村级土地利用规划中土地利用方向的确定和空间布局的划分提供科学的生态适宜依据，从而更好地协调农村发展建设和生态环境保护的关系有着至关重要的作用。以岩南村为例，开展了农村生态功能适宜性评价及应用研究。以高分辨率航空影像为数据源，从地形条件、土壤资源、生物资源、水资源、人类干扰5个方面建立了评价指标体系；利用组合赋权法确定各评价因子的权重值，构建了生态功能适宜性评价模型；以栅格为评价单元，在GIS支持下，对岩南村进行生态功能适宜性评价。并根据评价结果划分了生态功能适宜等级，制定了分区管制措施，提出了土地利用建议，旨在为岩南村土地利用规划提供指导     

Modelling coupled peach tree-aphid population dynamics and their control by winter pruning and nitrogen fertilization

Nitrogen fertilization and winter pruning are commonly used to control crop production in peach [Prunus persica (L.) Batsch] orchards. They are also known to affect the dynamics of Myzus persicae (Sulzer) (Homoptera: Aphididae) aphid populations via bottom-up regulation processes. Interactions between crops and pests can cause complex system behaviour in response to management practices. An integrated approach will therefore improve the understanding of the effects of these two cultural practices on aphid and peach performances.We developed a simulation model that describes the cultural control of interacting peach tree and aphid population dynamics. It uses the principles of common trophic models while gathering available knowledge and explicit assumptions on peach and aphid functioning and the effects of cultural practices.The model was able to qualitatively reproduce the system behaviour observed in the field. It accounted for actions and feedback such as stimulation of foliar growth by winter pruning, consecutive aphid population increase, subsequent damage to foliage, and partial compensatory growth of foliage. The model also reproduced low losses in fruit production due to aphid infestations. However, it called for further integration of ‘long-term’ effects. Analysis of the model showed the complexity of peach tree and aphid responses to leaf N × winter pruning interactions. Simulations indicated that fruit production losses remained low within a range of realistic values of leaf N and pruning intensity, whereas manipulating peach and aphid dynamics, their interactions and their relationships to practices could result in higher losses.The model is useful to evaluate the relevance of cultural practices for a bottom-up regulation of aphid dynamics in crop-pest management. After considering other control methods and fruit quality, it can be used to find a combination of practices that optimises trade-offs between fruit production and environmental conservation goals. A modelling approach that links crop growth and pest population dynamics and integrates management practice effects has strong potential for improving crop-pest management in an integrated crop production context.     

农地转用政策与农地转用最优数量——外部性内化视角的实证分析

尽管不少文献对农地转用政策的有效性进行了分析,但我国农地转用政策在农地-市地配置优化中的作用却较少受到关注。论文从外部性内化的视角出发,利用地方政府农地转用模型对土地用途管制、税费政策的作用机制和配置效应进行研究。在考虑多项政策影响的基础上,对湖北省地方政府决策函数进行拟合,并结合近年来农地外部性测算的结果实证分析了农地转用政策的合理性及其对农地转用数量的影响。实证结果表明,土地用途管制和税费政策均能显著地抑制农地转用数量,但政策的影响效果则存在差异。其中,税费政策的数量标准与外部性数量基本一致,但土地用途管制对农地转用的抑制效果已经超出了外部性内化的目标。根据这一结果,结论部分讨论了相应的政策含义及农地转用配置优化的对策建议。     

Good news for environmental self-regulation? Finding the right link

We investigate the stock market response to firm disclosure of positive environmental information and the link from that information to environmental outcomes. We classify environmental media releases by informational content and value relevance, and assess the abnormal stock returns of each type of event. While announcements of future environmental activities lead to the largest favorable stock market reactions, there is no guaranteed link from this type of information to environmental outcomes. Further analysis of the abnormal returns shows that the magnitude of the stock market reaction depends on firm financial characteristics across all event types rather than on firm environmental performance. Our results indicate that the ability for voluntary environmental information disclosure to induce environmental self-regulation is limited to the extent that firms are able to follow through with their announcements of planned environmental activities.     

Prices vs quantities with multiple pollutants

We examine the choice of policy instruments (price, quantity or a mix of the two) when two pollutants are regulated and firms' abatement costs are private information. Whether abatement efforts are complements or substitutes is key determining the choice of policies. When pollutants are complements, a mixed policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on another is sometimes preferable even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mixed policy is dominated by taxes or quotas.     

Economics of additionality for environmental services from agriculture

We present a model of additionality for offsets sold from agriculture to industrial sector sources regulated by cap-and-trade. We consider a potential policy where agricultural sources would not be covered by cap-and-trade requirements but would be eligible to receive offsets whenever their emissions fall below a policy-specified baseline, and would not be penalized for emissions above their baseline. Major results are: (1) The optimal baseline should be set above the average counterfactual emissions of participating farms, an unexpected result that has been missing from the literature. (2) The optimal trading ratio should be greater than one (a ton of offsets counts for less than a ton of covered emissions) even under emissions certainty. Previous research has justified such trading ratios by emissions uncertainty. (3) Emissions uncertainty does not justify a change in the baseline if the accompanying emissions model is unbiased. (4) An optimal combination of policies is to subsidize offsets and tighten the baseline relative to the no-subsidy case.     

Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

可持续发展环境约束条件下的水资源最优配置及实证研究

在相关理论分析和Weber模型的基础上。拓展建立了面向水资源可持续发展的水资源最优配置模型。引入了基于政府管制的影响作用、沿河流域的水用户的实际消耗水量、实际排放水量、河流中可供使用水量及所排放污水水质水平等5个变量函数．通过政府管制下的水质和水量的河道内流量需求等环境约束条件．确保水资源利用始终满足最小基流水量。通过求量优解，计算得出在环境约束下达到最优配置时各个变量函数与对下游地区外部性之间的相关性。接着。本文对陕北黄土高原沿Y河的35家企业进行了实际调查．收集了2个年度共8个季度的观测值，应用计量经济Pand Data模型。对35个节点、8个季度的共280个数据作为混合样本进行经济计量分析。验证了相关结论。最后。还提出一些制定环境约束条件以及水用户间建立水资源环境生态补偿金机制等政策建议。